Daily Papers

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

One major goal of the AI security community is to securely and reliably produce and deploy deep learning models for real-world applications. To this end, data poisoning based backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) in the production stage (or training stage) and corresponding defenses are extensively explored in recent years. Ironically, backdoor attacks in the deployment stage, which can often happen in unprofessional users' devices and are thus arguably far more threatening in real-world scenarios, draw much less attention of the community. We attribute this imbalance of vigilance to the weak practicality of existing deployment-stage backdoor attack algorithms and the insufficiency of real-world attack demonstrations. To fill the blank, in this work, we study the realistic threat of deployment-stage backdoor attacks on DNNs. We base our study on a commonly used deployment-stage attack paradigm -- adversarial weight attack, where adversaries selectively modify model weights to embed backdoor into deployed DNNs. To approach realistic practicality, we propose the first gray-box and physically realizable weights attack algorithm for backdoor injection, namely subnet replacement attack (SRA), which only requires architecture information of the victim model and can support physical triggers in the real world. Extensive experimental simulations and system-level real-world attack demonstrations are conducted. Our results not only suggest the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed attack algorithm, but also reveal the practical risk of a novel type of computer virus that may widely spread and stealthily inject backdoor into DNN models in user devices. By our study, we call for more attention to the vulnerability of DNNs in the deployment stage.

Creating secure and resilient applications with large language models (LLM) requires anticipating, adjusting to, and countering unforeseen threats. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical technique for identifying vulnerabilities in real-world LLM implementations. This paper presents a detailed threat model and provides a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of red-teaming attacks on LLMs. We develop a taxonomy of attacks based on the stages of the LLM development and deployment process and extract various insights from previous research. In addition, we compile methods for defense and practical red-teaming strategies for practitioners. By delineating prominent attack motifs and shedding light on various entry points, this paper provides a framework for improving the security and robustness of LLM-based systems.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

Over the years, adversarial attempts against critical services have become more effective and sophisticated in launching low-profile attacks. This trend has always been concerning. However, an even more alarming trend is the increasing difficulty of collecting relevant evidence about these attacks and the involved threat actors in the early stages before significant damage is done. This issue puts defenders at a significant disadvantage, as it becomes exceedingly difficult to understand the attack details and formulate an appropriate response. Developing robust forensics tools to collect evidence about modern threats has never been easy. One main challenge is to provide a robust trade-off between achieving sufficient visibility while leaving minimal detectable artifacts. This paper will introduce LASE, an open-source Low-Artifact Forensics Engine to perform threat analysis and forensics in Windows operating system. LASE augments current analysis tools by providing detailed, system-wide monitoring capabilities while minimizing detectable artifacts. We designed multiple deployment scenarios, showing LASE's potential in evidence gathering and threat reasoning in a real-world setting. By making LASE and its execution trace data available to the broader research community, this work encourages further exploration in the field by reducing the engineering costs for threat analysis and building a longitudinal behavioral analysis catalog for diverse security domains.

In this study, we investigate the emerging threat of inaudible acoustic attacks targeting digital voice assistants, a critical concern given their projected prevalence to exceed the global population by 2024. Our research extends the feasibility of these attacks across various platforms like Amazon's Alexa, Android, iOS, and Cortana, revealing significant vulnerabilities in smart devices. The twelve attack vectors identified include successful manipulation of smart home devices and automotive systems, potential breaches in military communication, and challenges in critical infrastructure security. We quantitatively show that attack success rates hover around 60%, with the ability to activate devices remotely from over 100 feet away. Additionally, these attacks threaten critical infrastructure, emphasizing the need for multifaceted defensive strategies combining acoustic shielding, advanced signal processing, machine learning, and robust user authentication to mitigate these risks.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

Robustness to adversarial attacks is typically obtained through expensive adversarial training with Projected Gradient Descent. Here we introduce ROPUST, a remarkably simple and efficient method to leverage robust pre-trained models and further increase their robustness, at no cost in natural accuracy. Our technique relies on the use of an Optical Processing Unit (OPU), a photonic co-processor, and a fine-tuning step performed with Direct Feedback Alignment, a synthetic gradient training scheme. We test our method on nine different models against four attacks in RobustBench, consistently improving over state-of-the-art performance. We perform an ablation study on the single components of our defense, showing that robustness arises from parameter obfuscation and the alternative training method. We also introduce phase retrieval attacks, specifically designed to increase the threat level of attackers against our own defense. We show that even with state-of-the-art phase retrieval techniques, ROPUST remains an effective defense.

Serverless computing is an emerging cloud paradigm with serverless functions at its core. While serverless environments enable software developers to focus on developing applications without the need to actively manage the underlying runtime infrastructure, they open the door to a wide variety of security threats that can be challenging to mitigate with existing methods. Existing security solutions do not apply to all serverless architectures, since they require significant modifications to the serverless infrastructure or rely on third-party services for the collection of more detailed data. In this paper, we present an extendable serverless security threat detection model that leverages cloud providers' native monitoring tools to detect anomalous behavior in serverless applications. Our model aims to detect compromised serverless functions by identifying post-exploitation abnormal behavior related to different types of attacks on serverless functions, and therefore, it is a last line of defense. Our approach is not tied to any specific serverless application, is agnostic to the type of threats, and is adaptable through model adjustments. To evaluate our model's performance, we developed a serverless cybersecurity testbed in an AWS cloud environment, which includes two different serverless applications and simulates a variety of attack scenarios that cover the main security threats faced by serverless functions. Our evaluation demonstrates our model's ability to detect all implemented attacks while maintaining a negligible false alarm rate.

Security is becoming a pivotal point in cloud platforms. Several divisions, such as business organisations, health care, government, etc., have experienced cyber-attacks on their infrastructures. This research focuses on security issues within Continuous Integration and Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines in a cloud platform as a reaction to recent cyber breaches. This research proposes a blockchain-based solution to enhance CI/CD pipeline security. This research aims to develop a framework that leverages blockchain's distributed ledger technology and tamper-resistant features to improve CI/CD pipeline security. The goal is to emphasise secure software deployment by integrating threat modelling frameworks and adherence to coding standards. It also aims to employ tools to automate security testing to detect publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and flaws, such as an outdated version of Java Spring Framework, a JavaScript library from an unverified source, or a database library that allows SQL injection attacks in the deployed software through the framework.

Recently, test-time adaptation (TTA) has been proposed as a promising solution for addressing distribution shifts. It allows a base model to adapt to an unforeseen distribution during inference by leveraging the information from the batch of (unlabeled) test data. However, we uncover a novel security vulnerability of TTA based on the insight that predictions on benign samples can be impacted by malicious samples in the same batch. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Distribution Invading Attack (DIA), which injects a small fraction of malicious data into the test batch. DIA causes models using TTA to misclassify benign and unperturbed test data, providing an entirely new capability for adversaries that is infeasible in canonical machine learning pipelines. Through comprehensive evaluations, we demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attack on multiple benchmarks across six TTA methods. In response, we investigate two countermeasures to robustify the existing insecure TTA implementations, following the principle of "security by design". Together, we hope our findings can make the community aware of the utility-security tradeoffs in deploying TTA and provide valuable insights for developing robust TTA approaches.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. To help us understand this change, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a specific vulnerability), and Patch (patching a specific vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, and cover 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a specific vulnerability. We evaluate 5 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI, and custom agents with GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Claude Code (5% on Detect, mapping to \1,350), Custom Agent with Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (5% on Detect, mapping to 1,025; 67.5% on Exploit), and OpenAI Codex CLI (5% on Detect, mapping to \2,400; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,422). OpenAI Codex CLI and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90% and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 32.5% and 57.5% respectively; in contrast, the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 40-67.5% and Patch scores of 45-60%.

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

As smart grids (SG) increasingly rely on advanced technologies like sensors and communication systems for efficient energy generation, distribution, and consumption, they become enticing targets for sophisticated cyberattacks. These evolving threats demand robust security measures to maintain the stability and resilience of modern energy systems. While extensive research has been conducted, a comprehensive exploration of proactive cyber defense strategies utilizing Deep Learning (DL) in {SG} remains scarce in the literature. This survey bridges this gap, studying the latest DL techniques for proactive cyber defense. The survey begins with an overview of related works and our distinct contributions, followed by an examination of SG infrastructure. Next, we classify various cyber defense techniques into reactive and proactive categories. A significant focus is placed on DL-enabled proactive defenses, where we provide a comprehensive taxonomy of DL approaches, highlighting their roles and relevance in the proactive security of SG. Subsequently, we analyze the most significant DL-based methods currently in use. Further, we explore Moving Target Defense, a proactive defense strategy, and its interactions with DL methodologies. We then provide an overview of benchmark datasets used in this domain to substantiate the discourse.{ This is followed by a critical discussion on their practical implications and broader impact on cybersecurity in Smart Grids.} The survey finally lists the challenges associated with deploying DL-based security systems within SG, followed by an outlook on future developments in this key field.

While Large Language Models have shown promise in cybersecurity applications, their effectiveness in identifying security threats within cloud deployments remains unexplored. This paper introduces AWS Cloud Security Engineering Eval, a novel dataset for evaluating LLMs cloud security threat modeling capabilities. ACSE-Eval contains 100 production grade AWS deployment scenarios, each featuring detailed architectural specifications, Infrastructure as Code implementations, documented security vulnerabilities, and associated threat modeling parameters. Our dataset enables systemic assessment of LLMs abilities to identify security risks, analyze attack vectors, and propose mitigation strategies in cloud environments. Our evaluations on ACSE-Eval demonstrate that GPT 4.1 and Gemini 2.5 Pro excel at threat identification, with Gemini 2.5 Pro performing optimally in 0-shot scenarios and GPT 4.1 showing superior results in few-shot settings. While GPT 4.1 maintains a slight overall performance advantage, Claude 3.7 Sonnet generates the most semantically sophisticated threat models but struggles with threat categorization and generalization. To promote reproducibility and advance research in automated cybersecurity threat analysis, we open-source our dataset, evaluation metrics, and methodologies.

Automated red teaming holds substantial promise for uncovering and mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of large language models (LLMs), yet the field lacks a standardized evaluation framework to rigorously assess new methods. To address this issue, we introduce HarmBench, a standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming. We identify several desirable properties previously unaccounted for in red teaming evaluations and systematically design HarmBench to meet these criteria. Using HarmBench, we conduct a large-scale comparison of 18 red teaming methods and 33 target LLMs and defenses, yielding novel insights. We also introduce a highly efficient adversarial training method that greatly enhances LLM robustness across a wide range of attacks, demonstrating how HarmBench enables codevelopment of attacks and defenses. We open source HarmBench at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

The prospect of artificial intelligence (AI) competing in the adversarial landscape of cyber security has long been considered one of the most impactful, challenging, and potentially dangerous applications of AI. Here, we demonstrate a new approach to assessing AI's progress towards enabling and scaling real-world offensive cyber operations (OCO) tactics in use by modern threat actors. We detail OCCULT, a lightweight operational evaluation framework that allows cyber security experts to contribute to rigorous and repeatable measurement of the plausible cyber security risks associated with any given large language model (LLM) or AI employed for OCO. We also prototype and evaluate three very different OCO benchmarks for LLMs that demonstrate our approach and serve as examples for building benchmarks under the OCCULT framework. Finally, we provide preliminary evaluation results to demonstrate how this framework allows us to move beyond traditional all-or-nothing tests, such as those crafted from educational exercises like capture-the-flag environments, to contextualize our indicators and warnings in true cyber threat scenarios that present risks to modern infrastructure. We find that there has been significant recent advancement in the risks of AI being used to scale realistic cyber threats. For the first time, we find a model (DeepSeek-R1) is capable of correctly answering over 90% of challenging offensive cyber knowledge tests in our Threat Actor Competency Test for LLMs (TACTL) multiple-choice benchmarks. We also show how Meta's Llama and Mistral's Mixtral model families show marked performance improvements over earlier models against our benchmarks where LLMs act as offensive agents in MITRE's high-fidelity offensive and defensive cyber operations simulation environment, CyberLayer.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming these models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods face significant drawbacks. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose a concise and effective two-stage framework that combines the advantages of these approaches. The first stage performs a scenario-based generation of context and rephrases the original malicious query to obscure its harmful intent. The second stage then utilizes information from the model's hidden states to guide fine-grained edits, effectively steering the model's internal representation of the input from a malicious toward a benign one. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this method achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate, with gains of up to 37.74% over the strongest baseline, and exhibits excellent transferability to black-box models. Our analysis further demonstrates that AGILE maintains substantial effectiveness against prominent defense mechanisms, highlighting the limitations of current safeguards and providing valuable insights for future defense development. Our code is available at https://github.com/yunsaijc/AGILE.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to attack graphs for penetration testing, however, trained agents do not reflect reality because the attack graphs lack operational nuances typically captured within the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that include notions of (cyber) terrain. In particular, current practice constructs attack graphs exclusively using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and its components. We present methods for constructing attack graphs using notions from IPB on cyber terrain analysis of obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment. We demonstrate our methods on an example where firewalls are treated as obstacles and represented in (1) the reward space and (2) the state dynamics. We show that terrain analysis can be used to bring realism to attack graphs for RL.

We present a systematic security assessment of the Unitree G1 humanoid showing it operates simultaneously as a covert surveillance node and can be purposed as an active cyber operations platform. Initial access can be achieved by exploiting the BLE provisioning protocol which contains a critical command injection vulnerability allowing root access via malformed Wi-Fi credentials, exploitable using hardcoded AES keys shared across all units. Partial reverse engineering of Unitree's proprietary FMX encryption reveal a static Blowfish-ECB layer and a predictable LCG mask-enabled inspection of the system's otherwise sophisticated security architecture, the most mature we have observed in commercial robotics. Two empirical case studies expose the critical risk of this humanoid robot: (a) the robot functions as a trojan horse, continuously exfiltrating multi-modal sensor and service-state telemetry to 43.175.228.18:17883 and 43.175.229.18:17883 every 300 seconds without operator notice, creating violations of GDPR Articles 6 and 13; (b) a resident Cybersecurity AI (CAI) agent can pivot from reconnaissance to offensive preparation against any target, such as the manufacturer's cloud control plane, demonstrating escalation from passive monitoring to active counter-operations. These findings argue for adaptive CAI-powered defenses as humanoids move into critical infrastructure, contributing the empirical evidence needed to shape future security standards for physical-cyber convergence systems.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by flipping only one critical bit on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.

Successful defense against dynamically evolving cyber threats requires advanced and sophisticated techniques. This research presents a novel approach to enhance real-time cybersecurity threat detection and response by integrating large language models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems with continuous threat intelligence feeds. Leveraging recent advancements in LLMs, specifically GPT-4o, and the innovative application of RAG techniques, our approach addresses the limitations of traditional static threat analysis by incorporating dynamic, real-time data sources. We leveraged RAG to get the latest information in real-time for threat intelligence, which is not possible in the existing GPT-4o model. We employ the Patrowl framework to automate the retrieval of diverse cybersecurity threat intelligence feeds, including Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) databases, and integrate these with the all-mpnet-base-v2 model for high-dimensional vector embeddings, stored and queried in Milvus. We demonstrate our system's efficacy through a series of case studies, revealing significant improvements in addressing recently disclosed vulnerabilities, KEVs, and high-EPSS-score CVEs compared to the baseline GPT-4o. This work not only advances the role of LLMs in cybersecurity but also establishes a robust foundation for the development of automated intelligent cyberthreat information management systems, addressing crucial gaps in current cybersecurity practices.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

With the rapid development of technology and the acceleration of digitalisation, the frequency and complexity of cyber security threats are increasing. Traditional cybersecurity approaches, often based on static rules and predefined scenarios, are struggling to adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of modern cyberattacks. There is an urgent need for more adaptive and intelligent defence strategies. The emergence of Large Language Model (LLM) provides an innovative solution to cope with the increasingly severe cyber threats, and its potential in analysing complex attack patterns, predicting threats and assisting real-time response has attracted a lot of attention in the field of cybersecurity, and exploring how to effectively use LLM to defend against cyberattacks has become a hot topic in the current research field. This survey examines the applications of LLM from the perspective of the cyber attack lifecycle, focusing on the three phases of defense reconnaissance, foothold establishment, and lateral movement, and it analyzes the potential of LLMs in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) tasks. Meanwhile, we investigate how LLM-based security solutions are deployed and applied in different network scenarios. It also summarizes the internal and external risk issues faced by LLM during its application. Finally, this survey also points out the facing risk issues and possible future research directions in this domain.

Vulnerabilities in open-source software can cause cascading effects in the modern digital ecosystem. It is especially worrying if these vulnerabilities repeat across many projects, as once the adversaries find one of them, they can scale up the attack very easily. Unfortunately, since developers frequently reuse code from their own or external code resources, some nearly identical vulnerabilities exist across many open-source projects. We conducted a study to examine the prevalence of a particular vulnerable code pattern that enables path traversal attacks (CWE-22) across open-source GitHub projects. To handle this study at the GitHub scale, we developed an automated pipeline that scans GitHub for the targeted vulnerable pattern, confirms the vulnerability by first running a static analysis and then exploiting the vulnerability in the context of the studied project, assesses its impact by calculating the CVSS score, generates a patch using GPT-4, and reports the vulnerability to the maintainers. Using our pipeline, we identified 1,756 vulnerable open-source projects, some of which are very influential. For many of the affected projects, the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score higher than 9.0), as it can be exploited remotely without any privileges and critically impact the confidentiality and availability of the system. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the maintainers, and 14\% of the reported vulnerabilities have been remediated. We also investigated the root causes of the vulnerable code pattern and assessed the side effects of the large number of copies of this vulnerable pattern that seem to have poisoned several popular LLMs. Our study highlights the urgent need to help secure the open-source ecosystem by leveraging scalable automated vulnerability management solutions and raising awareness among developers.

Engaging in the deliberate generation of abnormal outputs from Large Language Models (LLMs) by attacking them is a novel human activity. This paper presents a thorough exposition of how and why people perform such attacks, defining LLM red-teaming based on extensive and diverse evidence. Using a formal qualitative methodology, we interviewed dozens of practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, all contributors to this novel work of attempting to cause LLMs to fail. We focused on the research questions of defining LLM red teaming, uncovering the motivations and goals for performing the activity, and characterizing the strategies people use when attacking LLMs. Based on the data, LLM red teaming is defined as a limit-seeking, non-malicious, manual activity, which depends highly on a team-effort and an alchemist mindset. It is highly intrinsically motivated by curiosity, fun, and to some degrees by concerns for various harms of deploying LLMs. We identify a taxonomy of 12 strategies and 35 different techniques of attacking LLMs. These findings are presented as a comprehensive grounded theory of how and why people attack large language models: LLM red teaming.

Cyber attacks pose existential threats to nations and enterprises. Current practice favors piece-wise analysis using threat-models in the stead of rigorous cyber terrain analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Automated penetration testing using reinforcement learning offers a new and promising approach for developing methodologies that are driven by network structure and cyber terrain, that can be later interpreted in terms of threat-models, but that are principally network-driven analyses. This paper presents a novel method for crown jewel analysis termed CJA-RL that uses reinforcement learning to identify key terrain and avenues of approach for exploiting crown jewels. In our experiment, CJA-RL identified ideal entry points, choke points, and pivots for exploiting a network with multiple crown jewels, exemplifying how CJA-RL and reinforcement learning for penetration testing generally can benefit computer network operations workflows.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

Containerization, driven by Docker, has transformed application development and deployment by enhancing efficiency and scalability. However, the rapid adoption of container technologies introduces significant security challenges that require careful management. This paper investigates key areas of container security, including runtime protection, network safeguards, configuration best practices, supply chain security, and comprehensive monitoring and logging solutions. We identify common vulnerabilities within these domains and provide actionable recommendations to address and mitigate these risks. By integrating security throughout the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC), organizations can reinforce their security posture, creating a resilient and reliable containerized application infrastructure that withstands evolving threats.

AI assistants produce vulnerable code in 45% of security-relevant scenarios, introducing flaws into production systems at scale. Yet existing secure coding datasets fall short. They lack incident grounding, don't provide the scale modern training requires, and miss the operational security context developers need for production deployments. We present SecureCode v2.0, a production-grade dataset of 1,215 security-focused coding examples that passed structural validation and expert security review. Every example ties to actual documented security incidents with CVE references, provides vulnerable and secure implementations, demonstrates concrete attacks, and includes defense-in-depth operational guidance. The dataset covers 11 vulnerability categories (complete OWASP Top 10:2025 plus AI/ML Security Threats) across 11 languages (Python, JavaScript, Java, Go, PHP, C#, TypeScript, Ruby, Rust, Kotlin, and YAML for infrastructure-as-code). Our quality assurance framework ensures complete incident grounding. Each example includes SIEM integration strategies, infrastructure hardening recommendations (Docker, AppArmor, WAF configurations), and testing approaches using language-appropriate frameworks. The dataset uses a 4-turn conversational structure mirroring actual developer-AI interactions, escalating from basic implementations to advanced security considerations and defense-in-depth guidance. Our contributions: (1) 1,215 rigorously validated examples split into 989 training, 122 validation, and 104 test sets, (2) an automated validation framework ensuring dataset consistency, (3) a 4-turn conversational structure capturing realistic security workflows, (4) comprehensive operational security guidance with SIEM integration strategies, (5) complete language-specific implementation fidelity, and (6) open-source release of data, validation tools, and benchmarking protocols.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive results on natural language tasks, and security researchers are beginning to employ them in both offensive and defensive systems. In cyber-security, there have been multiple research efforts that utilize LLMs focusing on the pre-breach stage of attacks like phishing and malware generation. However, so far there lacks a comprehensive study regarding whether LLM-based systems can be leveraged to simulate the post-breach stage of attacks that are typically human-operated, or "hands-on-keyboard" attacks, under various attack techniques and environments. As LLMs inevitably advance, they may be able to automate both the pre- and post-breach attack stages. This shift may transform organizational attacks from rare, expert-led events to frequent, automated operations requiring no expertise and executed at automation speed and scale. This risks fundamentally changing global computer security and correspondingly causing substantial economic impacts, and a goal of this work is to better understand these risks now so we can better prepare for these inevitable ever-more-capable LLMs on the horizon. On the immediate impact side, this research serves three purposes. First, an automated LLM-based, post-breach exploitation framework can help analysts quickly test and continually improve their organization's network security posture against previously unseen attacks. Second, an LLM-based penetration test system can extend the effectiveness of red teams with a limited number of human analysts. Finally, this research can help defensive systems and teams learn to detect novel attack behaviors preemptively before their use in the wild....

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

LLMs have becoming increasingly powerful, both in their benign and malicious uses. With the increase in capabilities, researchers have been increasingly interested in their ability to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In particular, recent work has conducted preliminary studies on the ability of LLM agents to autonomously hack websites. However, these studies are limited to simple vulnerabilities. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously exploit one-day vulnerabilities in real-world systems. To show this, we collected a dataset of 15 one-day vulnerabilities that include ones categorized as critical severity in the CVE description. When given the CVE description, GPT-4 is capable of exploiting 87% of these vulnerabilities compared to 0% for every other model we test (GPT-3.5, open-source LLMs) and open-source vulnerability scanners (ZAP and Metasploit). Fortunately, our GPT-4 agent requires the CVE description for high performance: without the description, GPT-4 can exploit only 7% of the vulnerabilities. Our findings raise questions around the widespread deployment of highly capable LLM agents.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as public-facing web services and APIs has made their security a core concern for the web ecosystem. Jailbreak attacks, as one of the significant threats to LLMs, have recently attracted extensive research. In this paper, we reveal a jailbreak strategy which can effectively evade current defense strategies. It can extract valuable information from failed or partially successful attack attempts and contains self-evolution from attack interactions, resulting in sufficient strategy diversity and adaptability. Inspired by continuous learning and modular design principles, we propose ASTRA, a jailbreak framework that autonomously discovers, retrieves, and evolves attack strategies to achieve more efficient and adaptive attacks. To enable this autonomous evolution, we design a closed-loop "attack-evaluate-distill-reuse" core mechanism that not only generates attack prompts but also automatically distills and generalizes reusable attack strategies from every interaction. To systematically accumulate and apply this attack knowledge, we introduce a three-tier strategy library that categorizes strategies into Effective, Promising, and Ineffective based on their performance scores. The strategy library not only provides precise guidance for attack generation but also possesses exceptional extensibility and transferability. We conduct extensive experiments under a black-box setting, and the results show that ASTRA achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 82.7%, significantly outperforming baselines.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to real-world applications, powering services across diverse sectors. However, their widespread deployment has exposed critical security risks, particularly through jailbreak prompts that can bypass model alignment and induce harmful outputs. Despite intense research into both attack and defense techniques, the field remains fragmented: definitions, threat models, and evaluation criteria vary widely, impeding systematic progress and fair comparison. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we address these challenges by (1) proposing a holistic, multi-level taxonomy that organizes attacks, defenses, and vulnerabilities in LLM prompt security; (2) formalizing threat models and cost assumptions into machine-readable profiles for reproducible evaluation; (3) introducing an open-source evaluation toolkit for standardized, auditable comparison of attacks and defenses; (4) releasing JAILBREAKDB, the largest annotated dataset of jailbreak and benign prompts to date; and (5) presenting a comprehensive evaluation and leaderboard of state-of-the-art methods. Our work unifies fragmented research, provides rigorous foundations for future studies, and supports the development of robust, trustworthy LLMs suitable for high-stakes deployment.

An important function of collaborative network intrusion detection is to analyze the network logs of the collaborators for joint IP addresses. However, sharing IP addresses in plain is sensitive and may be even subject to privacy legislation as it is personally identifiable information. In this paper, we present the privacy-preserving collection of IP addresses. We propose a single collector, over-threshold private set intersection protocol. In this protocol N participants identify the IP addresses that appear in at least t participant's sets without revealing any information about other IP addresses. Using a novel hashing scheme, we reduce the computational complexity of the previous state-of-the-art solution from O(M(N M/t)^{2t}) to O(t^2MN{t}), where M denotes the dataset size. This reduction makes it practically feasible to apply our protocol to real network logs. We test our protocol using joint networks logs of multiple institutions. Additionally, we present two deployment options: a collusion-safe deployment, which provides stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased communication overhead, and a non-interactive deployment, which assumes a non-colluding collector but offers significantly lower communication costs and applicable to many use cases of collaborative network intrusion detection similar to ours.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Computer-use agent (CUA) frameworks, powered by large language models (LLMs) or multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), are rapidly maturing as assistants that can perceive context, reason, and act directly within software environments. Among their most critical applications is operating system (OS) control. As CUAs in the OS domain become increasingly embedded in daily operations, it is imperative to examine their real-world security implications, specifically whether CUAs can be misused to perform realistic, security-relevant attacks. Existing works exhibit four major limitations: Missing attacker-knowledge model on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), Incomplete coverage for end-to-end kill chains, unrealistic environment without multi-host and encrypted user credentials, and unreliable judgment dependent on LLM-as-a-Judge. To address these gaps, we propose AdvCUA, the first benchmark aligned with real-world TTPs in MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix, which comprises 140 tasks, including 40 direct malicious tasks, 74 TTP-based malicious tasks, and 26 end-to-end kill chains, systematically evaluates CUAs under a realistic enterprise OS security threat in a multi-host environment sandbox by hard-coded evaluation. We evaluate the existing five mainstream CUAs, including ReAct, AutoGPT, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI, and Cursor IDE based on 8 foundation LLMs. The results demonstrate that current frontier CUAs do not adequately cover OS security-centric threats. These capabilities of CUAs reduce dependence on custom malware and deep domain expertise, enabling even inexperienced attackers to mount complex enterprise intrusions, which raises social concern about the responsibility and security of CUAs.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are extensively used in critical infrastructures ensuring efficient, reliable, and continuous operations. However, their increasing connectivity and addition of advanced features make them vulnerable to cyber threats, potentially leading to severe disruptions in essential services. In this context, honeypots play a vital role by acting as decoy targets within ICS networks, or on the Internet, helping to detect, log, analyze, and develop mitigations for ICS-specific cyber threats. Deploying ICS honeypots, however, is challenging due to the necessity of accurately replicating industrial protocols and device characteristics, a crucial requirement for effectively mimicking the unique operational behavior of different industrial systems. Moreover, this challenge is compounded by the significant manual effort required in also mimicking the control logic the PLC would execute, in order to capture attacker traffic aiming to disrupt critical infrastructure operations. In this paper, we propose LLMPot, a novel approach for designing honeypots in ICS networks harnessing the potency of Large Language Models (LLMs). LLMPot aims to automate and optimize the creation of realistic honeypots with vendor-agnostic configurations, and for any control logic, aiming to eliminate the manual effort and specialized knowledge traditionally required in this domain. We conducted extensive experiments focusing on a wide array of parameters, demonstrating that our LLM-based approach can effectively create honeypot devices implementing different industrial protocols and diverse control logic.

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important part of enterprise security system architecture. In particular, anomaly-based IDS has been widely applied to detect abnormal process behaviors that deviate from the majority. However, such abnormal behavior usually consists of a series of low-level heterogeneous events. The gap between the low-level events and the high-level abnormal behaviors makes it hard to infer which single events are related to the real abnormal activities, especially considering that there are massive "noisy" low-level events happening in between. Hence, the existing work that focus on detecting single entities/events can hardly achieve high detection accuracy. Different from previous work, we design and implement GID, an efficient graph-based intrusion detection technique that can identify abnormal event sequences from a massive heterogeneous process traces with high accuracy. GID first builds a compact graph structure to capture the interactions between different system entities. The suspiciousness or anomaly score of process paths is then measured by leveraging random walk technique to the constructed acyclic directed graph. To eliminate the score bias from the path length, the Box-Cox power transformation based approach is introduced to normalize the anomaly scores so that the scores of paths of different lengths have the same distribution. The efficiency of suspicious path discovery is further improved by the proposed optimization scheme. We fully implement our GID algorithm and deploy it into a real enterprise security system, and it greatly helps detect the advanced threats, and optimize the incident response. Executing GID on system monitoring datasets showing that GID is efficient (about 2 million records per minute) and accurate (higher than 80% in terms of detection rate).

This paper analyzes Large Language Model (LLM) security vulnerabilities based on data from Crucible, encompassing 214,271 attack attempts by 1,674 users across 30 LLM challenges. Our findings reveal automated approaches significantly outperform manual techniques (69.5% vs 47.6% success rate), despite only 5.2% of users employing automation. We demonstrate that automated approaches excel in systematic exploration and pattern matching challenges, while manual approaches retain speed advantages in certain creative reasoning scenarios, often solving problems 5x faster when successful. Challenge categories requiring systematic exploration are most effectively targeted through automation, while intuitive challenges sometimes favor manual techniques for time-to-solve metrics. These results illuminate how algorithmic testing is transforming AI red-teaming practices, with implications for both offensive security research and defensive measures. Our analysis suggests optimal security testing combines human creativity for strategy development with programmatic execution for thorough exploration.

Fake base stations (FBSes) pose a significant security threat by impersonating legitimate base stations (BSes). Though efforts have been made to defeat this threat, up to this day, the presence of FBSes and the multi-step attacks (MSAs) stemming from them can lead to unauthorized surveillance, interception of sensitive information, and disruption of network services. Therefore, detecting these malicious entities is crucial to ensure the security and reliability of cellular networks. Traditional detection methods often rely on additional hardware, rules, signal scanning, changing protocol specifications, or cryptographic mechanisms that have limitations and incur huge infrastructure costs. In this paper, we develop FBSDetector-an effective and efficient detection solution that can reliably detect FBSes and MSAs from layer-3 network traces using machine learning (ML) at the user equipment (UE) side. To develop FBSDetector, we create FBSAD and MSAD, the first-ever high-quality and large-scale datasets incorporating instances of FBSes and 21 MSAs. These datasets capture the network traces in different real-world cellular network scenarios (including mobility and different attacker capabilities) incorporating legitimate BSes and FBSes. Our novel ML framework, specifically designed to detect FBSes in a multi-level approach for packet classification using stateful LSTM with attention and trace level classification and MSAs using graph learning, can effectively detect FBSes with an accuracy of 96% and a false positive rate of 2.96%, and recognize MSAs with an accuracy of 86% and a false positive rate of 3.28%. We deploy FBSDetector as a real-world solution to protect end-users through a mobile app and validate it in real-world environments. Compared to the existing heuristic-based solutions that fail to detect FBSes, FBSDetector can detect FBSes in the wild in real-time.

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.

Federated learning (FL) has been widely deployed to enable machine learning training on sensitive data across distributed devices. However, the decentralized learning paradigm and heterogeneity of FL further extend the attack surface for backdoor attacks. Existing FL attack and defense methodologies typically focus on the whole model. None of them recognizes the existence of backdoor-critical (BC) layers-a small subset of layers that dominate the model vulnerabilities. Attacking the BC layers achieves equivalent effects as attacking the whole model but at a far smaller chance of being detected by state-of-the-art (SOTA) defenses. This paper proposes a general in-situ approach that identifies and verifies BC layers from the perspective of attackers. Based on the identified BC layers, we carefully craft a new backdoor attack methodology that adaptively seeks a fundamental balance between attacking effects and stealthiness under various defense strategies. Extensive experiments show that our BC layer-aware backdoor attacks can successfully backdoor FL under seven SOTA defenses with only 10% malicious clients and outperform the latest backdoor attack methods.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

Organizations are increasingly targeted by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), which involve complex, multi-stage tactics and diverse techniques. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sources, such as incident reports and security blogs, provide valuable insights, but are often unstructured and in natural language, making it difficult to automatically extract information. Recent studies have explored the use of AI to perform automatic extraction from CTI data, leveraging existing CTI datasets for performance evaluation and fine-tuning. However, they present challenges and limitations that impact their effectiveness. To overcome these issues, we introduce a novel dataset manually constructed from CTI reports and structured according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. To assess its quality, we conducted an inter-annotator agreement study using Krippendorff alpha, confirming its reliability. Furthermore, the dataset was used to evaluate a Large Language Model (LLM) in a real-world business context, showing promising generalizability.

As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly automate complex web tasks, they boost productivity while simultaneously introducing new security risks. However, relevant studies on web agent attacks remain limited. Existing red-teaming approaches mainly rely on manually crafted attack strategies or static models trained offline. Such methods fail to capture the underlying behavioral patterns of web agents, making it difficult to generalize across diverse environments. In web agent attacks, success requires the continuous discovery and evolution of attack strategies. To this end, we propose Genesis, a novel agentic framework composed of three modules: Attacker, Scorer, and Strategist. The Attacker generates adversarial injections by integrating the genetic algorithm with a hybrid strategy representation. The Scorer evaluates the target web agent's responses to provide feedback. The Strategist dynamically uncovers effective strategies from interaction logs and compiles them into a continuously growing strategy library, which is then re-deployed to enhance the Attacker's effectiveness. Extensive experiments across various web tasks show that our framework discovers novel strategies and consistently outperforms existing attack baselines.

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation wireless networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to service providers. As WMNs become an increasingly popular replacement technology for last-mile connectivity to the home networking, community and neighborhood networking, it is imperative to design efficient and secure communication protocols for these networks. However, several vulnerabilities exist in currently existing protocols for WMNs. These security loopholes can be exploited by potential attackers to launch attack on WMNs. The absence of a central point of administration makes securing WMNs even more challenging. The broadcast nature of transmission and the dependency on the intermediate nodes for multi-hop communications lead to several security vulnerabilities in WMNs. The attacks can be external as well as internal in nature. External attacks are launched by intruders who are not authorized users of the network. For example, an intruding node may eavesdrop on the packets and replay those packets at a later point of time to gain access to the network resources. On the other hand, the internal attacks are launched by the nodes that are part of the WMN. On example of such attack is an intermediate node dropping packets which it was supposed to forward. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on the current authentication and privacy protection schemes for WMN. In addition, it proposes a novel security protocol for node authentication and message confidentiality and an anonymization scheme for privacy protection of users in WMNs.

Recent advances have enabled LLM-powered AI agents to autonomously execute complex tasks by combining language model reasoning with tools, memory, and web access. But can these systems be trusted to follow deployment policies in realistic environments, especially under attack? To investigate, we ran the largest public red-teaming competition to date, targeting 22 frontier AI agents across 44 realistic deployment scenarios. Participants submitted 1.8 million prompt-injection attacks, with over 60,000 successfully eliciting policy violations such as unauthorized data access, illicit financial actions, and regulatory noncompliance. We use these results to build the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark - a curated set of high-impact attacks - and evaluate it across 19 state-of-the-art models. Nearly all agents exhibit policy violations for most behaviors within 10-100 queries, with high attack transferability across models and tasks. Importantly, we find limited correlation between agent robustness and model size, capability, or inference-time compute, suggesting that additional defenses are needed against adversarial misuse. Our findings highlight critical and persistent vulnerabilities in today's AI agents. By releasing the ART benchmark and accompanying evaluation framework, we aim to support more rigorous security assessment and drive progress toward safer agent deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

Foundation models are increasingly becoming better autonomous programmers, raising the prospect that they could also automate dangerous offensive cyber-operations. Current frontier model audits probe the cybersecurity risks of such agents, but most fail to account for the degrees of freedom available to adversaries in the real world. In particular, with strong verifiers and financial incentives, agents for offensive cybersecurity are amenable to iterative improvement by would-be adversaries. We argue that assessments should take into account an expanded threat model in the context of cybersecurity, emphasizing the varying degrees of freedom that an adversary may possess in stateful and non-stateful environments within a fixed compute budget. We show that even with a relatively small compute budget (8 H100 GPU Hours in our study), adversaries can improve an agent's cybersecurity capability on InterCode CTF by more than 40\% relative to the baseline -- without any external assistance. These results highlight the need to evaluate agents' cybersecurity risk in a dynamic manner, painting a more representative picture of risk.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Evasion attacks are a threat to machine learning models, where adversaries attempt to affect classifiers by injecting malicious samples. An alarming side-effect of evasion attacks is their ability to transfer among different models: this property is called transferability. Therefore, an attacker can produce adversarial samples on a custom model (surrogate) to conduct the attack on a victim's organization later. Although literature widely discusses how adversaries can transfer their attacks, their experimental settings are limited and far from reality. For instance, many experiments consider both attacker and defender sharing the same dataset, balance level (i.e., how the ground truth is distributed), and model architecture. In this work, we propose the DUMB attacker model. This framework allows analyzing if evasion attacks fail to transfer when the training conditions of surrogate and victim models differ. DUMB considers the following conditions: Dataset soUrces, Model architecture, and the Balance of the ground truth. We then propose a novel testbed to evaluate many state-of-the-art evasion attacks with DUMB; the testbed consists of three computer vision tasks with two distinct datasets each, four types of balance levels, and three model architectures. Our analysis, which generated 13K tests over 14 distinct attacks, led to numerous novel findings in the scope of transferable attacks with surrogate models. In particular, mismatches between attackers and victims in terms of dataset source, balance levels, and model architecture lead to non-negligible loss of attack performance.

Open source code is considered a common practice in modern software development. However, reusing other code allows bad actors to access a wide developers' community, hence the products that rely on it. Those attacks are categorized as supply chain attacks. Recent years saw a growing number of supply chain attacks that leverage open source during software development, relaying the download and installation procedures, whether automatic or manual. Over the years, many approaches have been invented for detecting vulnerable packages. However, it is uncommon to detect malicious code within packages. Those detection approaches can be broadly categorized as analyzes that use (dynamic) and do not use (static) code execution. Here, we introduce Malicious Source code Detection using Transformers (MSDT) algorithm. MSDT is a novel static analysis based on a deep learning method that detects real-world code injection cases to source code packages. In this study, we used MSDT and a dataset with over 600,000 different functions to embed various functions and applied a clustering algorithm to the resulting vectors, detecting the malicious functions by detecting the outliers. We evaluated MSDT's performance by conducting extensive experiments and demonstrated that our algorithm is capable of detecting functions that were injected with malicious code with precision@k values of up to 0.909.

Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant (VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assistants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communication mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this attack method is only effective on Google Assistant, which is the official voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be activated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instruments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the activation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

The proliferation of pre-trained models (PTMs) and datasets has led to the emergence of centralized model hubs like Hugging Face, which facilitate collaborative development and reuse. However, recent security reports have uncovered vulnerabilities and instances of malicious attacks within these platforms, highlighting growing security concerns. This paper presents the first systematic study of malicious code poisoning attacks on pre-trained model hubs, focusing on the Hugging Face platform. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis, develop a taxonomy of model formats, and perform root cause analysis of vulnerable formats. While existing tools like Fickling and ModelScan offer some protection, they face limitations in semantic-level analysis and comprehensive threat detection. To address these challenges, we propose MalHug, an end-to-end pipeline tailored for Hugging Face that combines dataset loading script extraction, model deserialization, in-depth taint analysis, and heuristic pattern matching to detect and classify malicious code poisoning attacks in datasets and models. In collaboration with Ant Group, a leading financial technology company, we have implemented and deployed MalHug on a mirrored Hugging Face instance within their infrastructure, where it has been operational for over three months. During this period, MalHug has monitored more than 705K models and 176K datasets, uncovering 91 malicious models and 9 malicious dataset loading scripts. These findings reveal a range of security threats, including reverse shell, browser credential theft, and system reconnaissance. This work not only bridges a critical gap in understanding the security of the PTM supply chain but also provides a practical, industry-tested solution for enhancing the security of pre-trained model hubs.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks -- models lose their safety alignment ability after fine-tuning on a few harmful samples. For risk mitigation, a guardrail is typically used to filter out harmful samples before fine-tuning. By designing a new red-teaming method, we in this paper show that purely relying on the moderation guardrail for data filtration is not reliable. Our proposed attack method, dubbed Virus, easily bypasses the guardrail moderation by slightly modifying the harmful data. Experimental results show that the harmful data optimized by Virus is not detectable by the guardrail with up to 100\% leakage ratio, and can simultaneously achieve superior attack performance. Finally, the key message we want to convey through this paper is that: it is reckless to consider guardrail moderation as a clutch at straws towards harmful fine-tuning attack, as it cannot solve the inherent safety issue of the pre-trained LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Virus

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist, including: (i) a low success rate, (ii) high algorithmic complexity, and (iii) a large number of test patterns. Furthermore, the most pertinent drawback of prior detection techniques stems from an incorrect evaluation methodology, i.e., they assume that an adversary inserts HTs randomly. Such inappropriate adversarial assumptions enable detection techniques to claim high HT detection accuracy, leading to a "false sense of security." Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, despite more than a decade of research on detecting HTs inserted during fabrication, there have been no concerted efforts to perform a systematic evaluation of HT detection techniques. In this paper, we play the role of a realistic adversary and question the efficacy of HT detection techniques by developing an automated, scalable, and practical attack framework, ATTRITION, using reinforcement learning (RL). ATTRITION evades eight detection techniques across two HT detection categories, showcasing its agnostic behavior. ATTRITION achieves average attack success rates of 47times and 211times compared to randomly inserted HTs against state-of-the-art HT detection techniques. We demonstrate ATTRITION's ability to evade detection techniques by evaluating designs ranging from the widely-used academic suites to larger designs such as the open-source MIPS and mor1kx processors to AES and a GPS module. Additionally, we showcase the impact of ATTRITION-generated HTs through two case studies (privilege escalation and kill switch) on the mor1kx processor. We envision that our work, along with our released HT benchmarks and models, fosters the development of better HT detection techniques.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in generating firmware for embedded systems, but often introduce security flaws and fail to meet real-time performance constraints. This paper proposes a three-phase methodology that combines LLM-based firmware generation with automated security validation and iterative refinement in a virtualized environment. Using structured prompts, models like GPT-4 generate firmware for networking and control tasks, deployed on FreeRTOS via QEMU. These implementations are tested using fuzzing, static analysis, and runtime monitoring to detect vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows (CWE-120), race conditions (CWE-362), and denial-of-service threats (CWE-400). Specialized AI agents for Threat Detection, Performance Optimization, and Compliance Verification collaborate to improve detection and remediation. Identified issues are categorized using CWE, then used to prompt targeted LLM-generated patches in an iterative loop. Experiments show a 92.4\% Vulnerability Remediation Rate (37.3\% improvement), 95.8\% Threat Model Compliance, and 0.87 Security Coverage Index. Real-time metrics include 8.6ms worst-case execution time and 195μs jitter. This process enhances firmware security and performance while contributing an open-source dataset for future research.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

We explore the feasibility and effectiveness of using LLM-driven autonomous systems for Assumed Breach penetration testing in enterprise networks. We introduce a novel prototype that, driven by Large Language Models (LLMs), can compromise accounts within a real-life Active Directory testbed. Our research provides a comprehensive evaluation of the prototype's capabilities, and highlights both strengths and limitations while executing attack. The evaluation uses a realistic simulation environment (Game of Active Directory, GOAD) to capture intricate interactions, stochastic outcomes, and timing dependencies that characterize live network scenarios. The study concludes that autonomous LLMs are able to conduct Assumed Breach simulations, potentially democratizing access to penetration testing for organizations facing budgetary constraints. The prototype's source code, traces, and analyzed logs are released as open-source to enhance collective cybersecurity and facilitate future research in LLM-driven cybersecurity automation.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an ASR of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning ASRs of up to 50% in realistic end-to-end settings, with the recently released frontier Claude 4 Opus | CUA showing an alarming ASR of 48%, demonstrating that indirect prompt injection presents tangible risks for even advanced CUAs despite their capabilities and safeguards. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

The field of software security testing, more specifically penetration testing, is an activity that requires high levels of expertise and involves many manual testing and analysis steps. This paper explores the potential usage of large-language models, such as GPT3.5, to augment penetration testers with AI sparring partners. We explore the feasibility of supplementing penetration testers with AI models for two distinct use cases: high-level task planning for security testing assignments and low-level vulnerability hunting within a vulnerable virtual machine. For the latter, we implemented a closed-feedback loop between LLM-generated low-level actions with a vulnerable virtual machine (connected through SSH) and allowed the LLM to analyze the machine state for vulnerabilities and suggest concrete attack vectors which were automatically executed within the virtual machine. We discuss promising initial results, detail avenues for improvement, and close deliberating on the ethics of providing AI-based sparring partners.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .

Many cyberattacks start with disseminating phishing URLs. When clicking these phishing URLs, the victim's private information is leaked to the attacker. There have been proposed several machine learning methods to detect phishing URLs. However, it still remains under-explored to detect phishing URLs with evasion, i.e., phishing URLs that pretend to be benign by manipulating patterns. In many cases, the attacker i) reuses prepared phishing web pages because making a completely brand-new set costs non-trivial expenses, ii) prefers hosting companies that do not require private information and are cheaper than others, iii) prefers shared hosting for cost efficiency, and iv) sometimes uses benign domains, IP addresses, and URL string patterns to evade existing detection methods. Inspired by those behavioral characteristics, we present a network-based inference method to accurately detect phishing URLs camouflaged with legitimate patterns, i.e., robust to evasion. In the network approach, a phishing URL will be still identified as phishy even after evasion unless a majority of its neighbors in the network are evaded at the same time. Our method consistently shows better detection performance throughout various experimental tests than state-of-the-art methods, e.g., F-1 of 0.89 for our method vs. 0.84 for the best feature-based method.

We are releasing a new suite of security benchmarks for LLMs, CYBERSECEVAL 3, to continue the conversation on empirically measuring LLM cybersecurity risks and capabilities. CYBERSECEVAL 3 assesses 8 different risks across two broad categories: risk to third parties, and risk to application developers and end users. Compared to previous work, we add new areas focused on offensive security capabilities: automated social engineering, scaling manual offensive cyber operations, and autonomous offensive cyber operations. In this paper we discuss applying these benchmarks to the Llama 3 models and a suite of contemporaneous state-of-the-art LLMs, enabling us to contextualize risks both with and without mitigations in place.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications, safeguarding them against unsafe, malicious, or privacy-violating content is critically important. We present OpenGuardrails, the first open-source project to provide both a context-aware safety and manipulation detection model and a deployable platform for comprehensive AI guardrails. OpenGuardrails protects against content-safety risks, model-manipulation attacks (e.g., prompt injection, jailbreaking, code-interpreter abuse, and the generation/execution of malicious code), and data leakage. Content-safety and model-manipulation detection are implemented by a unified large model, while data-leakage identification and redaction are performed by a separate lightweight NER pipeline (e.g., Presidio-style models or regex-based detectors). The system can be deployed as a security gateway or an API-based service, with enterprise-grade, fully private deployment options. OpenGuardrails achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on safety benchmarks, excelling in both prompt and response classification across English, Chinese, and multilingual tasks. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

While previous distribution shift detection approaches can identify if a shift has occurred, these approaches cannot localize which specific features have caused a distribution shift -- a critical step in diagnosing or fixing any underlying issue. For example, in military sensor networks, users will want to detect when one or more of the sensors has been compromised, and critically, they will want to know which specific sensors might be compromised. Thus, we first define a formalization of this problem as multiple conditional distribution hypothesis tests and propose both non-parametric and parametric statistical tests. For both efficiency and flexibility, we then propose to use a test statistic based on the density model score function (i.e. gradient with respect to the input) -- which can easily compute test statistics for all dimensions in a single forward and backward pass. Any density model could be used for computing the necessary statistics including deep density models such as normalizing flows or autoregressive models. We additionally develop methods for identifying when and where a shift occurs in multivariate time-series data and show results for multiple scenarios using realistic attack models on both simulated and real world data.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose an increasingly substantial cybersecurity threat to organizations across the globe. In this paper, we introduce a new deep learning-based technique for detecting DDoS attacks, a paramount cybersecurity challenge with evolving complexity and scale. Specifically, we propose a new dual-space prototypical network that leverages a unique dual-space loss function to enhance detection accuracy for various attack patterns through geometric and angular similarity measures. This approach capitalizes on the strengths of representation learning within the latent space (a lower-dimensional representation of data that captures complex patterns for machine learning analysis), improving the model's adaptability and sensitivity towards varying DDoS attack vectors. Our comprehensive evaluation spans multiple training environments, including offline training, simulated online training, and prototypical network scenarios, to validate the model's robustness under diverse data abundance and scarcity conditions. The Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) with Attention, trained with our dual-space prototypical design over a reduced training set, achieves an average accuracy of 94.85% and an F1-Score of 94.71% across our tests, showcasing its effectiveness in dynamic and constrained real-world scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of 5G technology, the adoption of cloud-based infrastructure for the deployment of 5G services has become increasingly common. Using a service-based architecture, critical 5G components, such as the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), Session Management Function (SMF), and User Plane Function (UPF), now run as containerized pods on Kubernetes clusters. Although this approach improves scalability, flexibility, and resilience, it also introduces new security challenges, particularly to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of these components. Current 5G security specifications (for example, 3GPP TS 33.501) focus on communication security and assume that network functions remain trustworthy after authentication, consequently lacking mechanisms to continuously validate the integrity of NVFs at runtime. To close this gap, and to align with Zero Trust principles of 'never trust, always verify', we present a TPM 2.0-based continuous remote attestation solution for core 5G components deployed on Kubernetes. Our approach uses the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to provide hardware-based runtime validation. We integrate the open-source Keylime framework with a custom IMA template that isolates pod-level measurements, allowing per-pod integrity verification. A prototype on a k3s cluster (consisting of 1 master, 2 worker nodes) was implemented to attest to core functions, including AMF, SMF and UPF. The experimental results show that the system detects unauthorized modifications in real time, labels each pod's trust state, and generates detailed audit logs. This work provides hardware-based continuous attestation for cloud native and edge deployments, strengthening the resilience of 5G as critical infrastructure in multi-vendor and mission-critical scenarios of 5G.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

The exploitation of large language models (LLMs) for malicious purposes poses significant security risks as these models become more powerful and widespread. While most existing red-teaming frameworks focus on single-turn attacks, real-world adversaries typically operate in multi-turn scenarios, iteratively probing for vulnerabilities and adapting their prompts based on threat model responses. In this paper, we propose \AlgName, a novel multi-turn red-teaming agent that emulates sophisticated human attackers through complementary learning dimensions: global tactic-wise learning that accumulates knowledge over time and generalizes to new attack goals, and local prompt-wise learning that refines implementations for specific goals when initial attempts fail. Unlike previous multi-turn approaches that rely on fixed strategy sets, \AlgName enables the agent to identify new jailbreak tactics, develop a goal-based tactic selection framework, and refine prompt formulations for selected tactics. Empirical evaluations on JailbreakBench demonstrate our framework's superior performance, achieving over 90\% attack success rates against GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-3.1-70B within 5 conversation turns, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines. These results highlight the effectiveness of dynamic learning in identifying and exploiting model vulnerabilities in realistic multi-turn scenarios.

The Internet of Things has expanded rapidly, transforming communication and operations across industries but also increasing the attack surface and security breaches. Artificial Intelligence plays a key role in securing IoT, enabling attack detection, attack behavior analysis, and mitigation suggestion. Despite advancements, evaluations remain purely qualitative, and the lack of a standardized, objective benchmark for quantitatively measuring AI-based attack analysis and mitigation hinders consistent assessment of model effectiveness. In this work, we propose a hybrid framework combining Machine Learning (ML) for multi-class attack detection with Large Language Models (LLMs) for attack behavior analysis and mitigation suggestion. After benchmarking several ML and Deep Learning (DL) classifiers on the Edge-IIoTset and CICIoT2023 datasets, we applied structured role-play prompt engineering with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to guide ChatGPT-o3 and DeepSeek-R1 in producing detailed, context-aware responses. We introduce novel evaluation metrics for quantitative assessment to guide us and an ensemble of judge LLMs, namely ChatGPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, Mixtral 8x7B Instruct, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Meta Llama 4, TII Falcon H1 34B Instruct, xAI Grok 3, and Claude 4 Sonnet, to independently evaluate the responses. Results show that Random Forest has the best detection model, and ChatGPT-o3 outperformed DeepSeek-R1 in attack analysis and mitigation.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

The effectiveness and efficiency of 5G software stack vulnerability and unintended behavior detection are essential for 5G assurance, especially for its applications in critical infrastructures. Scalability and automation are the main challenges in testing approaches and cybersecurity research. In this paper, we propose an innovative approach for automatically detecting vulnerabilities, unintended emergent behaviors, and performance degradation in 5G stacks via run-time profiling documents corresponding to fuzz testing in code repositories. Piloting on srsRAN, we map the run-time profiling via Logging Information (LogInfo) generated by fuzzing test to a high dimensional metric space first and then construct feature spaces based on their timestamp information. Lastly, we further leverage machine learning-based classification algorithms, including Logistic Regression, K-Nearest Neighbors, and Random Forest to categorize the impacts on performance and security attributes. The performance of the proposed approach has high accuracy, ranging from 93.4 % to 95.9 % , in detecting the fuzzing impacts. In addition, the proof of concept could identify and prioritize real-time vulnerabilities on 5G infrastructures and critical applications in various verticals.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

While smishing (SMS Phishing) attacks have risen to become one of the most common types of social engineering attacks, there is a lack of relevant smishing datasets. One of the biggest challenges in the domain of smishing prevention is the availability of fresh smishing datasets. Additionally, as time persists, smishing campaigns are shut down and the crucial information related to the attack are lost. With the changing nature of smishing attacks, a consistent flow of new smishing examples is needed by both researchers and engineers to create effective defenses. In this paper, we present the community-sourced smishing datasets from the smishtank.com. It provides a wealth of information relevant to combating smishing attacks through the breakdown and analysis of smishing samples at the point of submission. In the contribution of our work, we provide a corpus of 1090 smishing samples that have been publicly submitted through the site. Each message includes information relating to the sender, message body, and any brands referenced in the message. Additionally, when a URL is found, we provide additional information on the domain, VirusTotal results, and a characterization of the URL. Through the open access of fresh smishing data, we empower academia and industries to create robust defenses against this evolving threat.

The Internet of Things (IoT) triggers new types of cyber risks. Therefore, the integration of new IoT devices and services requires a self-assessment of IoT cyber security posture. By security posture this article refers to the cybersecurity strength of an organisation to predict, prevent and respond to cyberthreats. At present, there is a gap in the state of the art, because there are no self-assessment methods for quantifying IoT cyber risk posture. To address this gap, an empirical analysis is performed of 12 cyber risk assessment approaches. The results and the main findings from the analysis is presented as the current and a target risk state for IoT systems, followed by conclusions and recommendations on a transformation roadmap, describing how IoT systems can achieve the target state with a new goal-oriented dependency model. By target state, we refer to the cyber security target that matches the generic security requirements of an organisation. The research paper studies and adapts four alternatives for IoT risk assessment and identifies the goal-oriented dependency modelling as a dominant approach among the risk assessment models studied. The new goal-oriented dependency model in this article enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

The autonomous AI agents using large language models can create undeniable values in all span of the society but they face security threats from adversaries that warrants immediate protective solutions because trust and safety issues arise. Considering the many-shot jailbreaking and deceptive alignment as some of the main advanced attacks, that cannot be mitigated by the static guardrails used during the supervised training, points out a crucial research priority for real world robustness. The combination of static guardrails in dynamic multi-agent system fails to defend against those attacks. We intend to enhance security for LLM-based agents through the development of new evaluation frameworks which identify and counter threats for safe operational deployment. Our work uses three examination methods to detect rogue agents through a Reverse Turing Test and analyze deceptive alignment through multi-agent simulations and develops an anti-jailbreaking system by testing it with GEMINI 1.5 pro and llama-3.3-70B, deepseek r1 models using tool-mediated adversarial scenarios. The detection capabilities are strong such as 94\% accuracy for GEMINI 1.5 pro yet the system suffers persistent vulnerabilities when under long attacks as prompt length increases attack success rates (ASR) and diversity metrics become ineffective in prediction while revealing multiple complex system faults. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adopting flexible security systems based on active monitoring that can be performed by the agents themselves together with adaptable interventions by system admin as the current models can create vulnerabilities that can lead to the unreliable and vulnerable system. So, in our work, we try to address such situations and propose a comprehensive framework to counteract the security issues.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

The security context used in 5G authentication is generated during the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and stored in both the user equipment (UE) and the network sides for the subsequent fast registration procedure. Given its importance, it is imperative to formally analyze the security mechanism of the security context. The security context in the UE can be stored in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card or in the baseband chip. In this work, we present a comprehensive and formal verification of the fast registration procedure based on the security context under the two scenarios in ProVerif. Our analysis identifies two vulnerabilities, including one that has not been reported before. Specifically, the security context stored in the USIM card can be read illegally, and the validity checking mechanism of the security context in the baseband chip can be bypassed. Moreover, these vulnerabilities also apply to 4G networks. As a consequence, an attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to register to the network with the victim's identity and then launch other attacks, including one-tap authentication bypass leading to privacy disclosure, location spoofing, etc. To ensure that these attacks are indeed realizable in practice, we have responsibly confirmed them through experimentation in three operators. Our analysis reveals that these vulnerabilities stem from design flaws of the standard and unsafe practices by operators. We finally propose several potential countermeasures to prevent these attacks. We have reported our findings to the GSMA and received a coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) number CVD-2022-0057.

Catalyzed by the popularity of blockchain technology, there has recently been a renewed interest in the design, implementation and evaluation of decentralized systems. Most of these systems are intended to be deployed at scale and in heterogeneous environments with real users and unpredictable workloads. Nevertheless, most research in this field evaluates such systems in controlled environments that poorly reflect the complex conditions of real-world environments. In this work, we argue that deployment is crucial to understanding decentralized mechanisms in a real-world environment and an enabler to building more robust and sustainable systems. We highlight the merits of deployment by comparing this approach with other experimental setups and show how our lab applied a deployment-first methodology. We then outline how we use Tribler, our peer-to-peer file-sharing application, to deploy and monitor decentralized mechanisms at scale. We illustrate the application of our methodology by describing a deployment trial in experimental tokenomics. Finally, we summarize four lessons learned from multiple deployment trials where we applied our methodology.

One of the most common causes of lack of continuity of online systems stems from a widely popular Cyber Attack known as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), in which a network of infected devices (botnet) gets exploited to flood the computational capacity of services through the commands of an attacker. This attack is made by leveraging the Domain Name System (DNS) technology through Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs), a stealthy connection strategy that yet leaves suspicious data patterns. To detect such threats, advances in their analysis have been made. For the majority, they found Machine Learning (ML) as a solution, which can be highly effective in analyzing and classifying massive amounts of data. Although strongly performing, ML models have a certain degree of obscurity in their decision-making process. To cope with this problem, a branch of ML known as Explainable ML tries to break down the black-box nature of classifiers and make them interpretable and human-readable. This work addresses the problem of Explainable ML in the context of botnet and DGA detection, which at the best of our knowledge, is the first to concretely break down the decisions of ML classifiers when devised for botnet/DGA detection, therefore providing global and local explanations.

Federated learning is used to train a shared model in a decentralized way without clients sharing private data with each other. Federated learning systems are susceptible to poisoning attacks when malicious clients send false updates to the central server. Existing defense strategies are ineffective under non-IID data settings. This paper proposes a new defense strategy, FedCPA (Federated learning with Critical Parameter Analysis). Our attack-tolerant aggregation method is based on the observation that benign local models have similar sets of top-k and bottom-k critical parameters, whereas poisoned local models do not. Experiments with different attack scenarios on multiple datasets demonstrate that our model outperforms existing defense strategies in defending against poisoning attacks.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Quantization leverages lower-precision weights to reduce the memory usage of large language models (LLMs) and is a key technique for enabling their deployment on commodity hardware. While LLM quantization's impact on utility has been extensively explored, this work for the first time studies its adverse effects from a security perspective. We reveal that widely used quantization methods can be exploited to produce a harmful quantized LLM, even though the full-precision counterpart appears benign, potentially tricking users into deploying the malicious quantized model. We demonstrate this threat using a three-staged attack framework: (i) first, we obtain a malicious LLM through fine-tuning on an adversarial task; (ii) next, we quantize the malicious model and calculate constraints that characterize all full-precision models that map to the same quantized model; (iii) finally, using projected gradient descent, we tune out the poisoned behavior from the full-precision model while ensuring that its weights satisfy the constraints computed in step (ii). This procedure results in an LLM that exhibits benign behavior in full precision but when quantized, it follows the adversarial behavior injected in step (i). We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility and severity of such an attack across three diverse scenarios: vulnerable code generation, content injection, and over-refusal attack. In practice, the adversary could host the resulting full-precision model on an LLM community hub such as Hugging Face, exposing millions of users to the threat of deploying its malicious quantized version on their devices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

The escalating reliance on revolutionary online web services has introduced heightened security risks, with persistent challenges posed by phishing despite extensive security measures. Traditional phishing systems, reliant on machine learning and manual features, struggle with evolving tactics. Recent advances in deep learning offer promising avenues for tackling novel phishing challenges and malicious URLs. This paper introduces a two-phase stack generalized model named AntiPhishStack, designed to detect phishing sites. The model leverages the learning of URLs and character-level TF-IDF features symmetrically, enhancing its ability to combat emerging phishing threats. In Phase I, features are trained on a base machine learning classifier, employing K-fold cross-validation for robust mean prediction. Phase II employs a two-layered stacked-based LSTM network with five adaptive optimizers for dynamic compilation, ensuring premier prediction on these features. Additionally, the symmetrical predictions from both phases are optimized and integrated to train a meta-XGBoost classifier, contributing to a final robust prediction. The significance of this work lies in advancing phishing detection with AntiPhishStack, operating without prior phishing-specific feature knowledge. Experimental validation on two benchmark datasets, comprising benign and phishing or malicious URLs, demonstrates the model's exceptional performance, achieving a notable 96.04% accuracy compared to existing studies. This research adds value to the ongoing discourse on symmetry and asymmetry in information security and provides a forward-thinking solution for enhancing network security in the face of evolving cyber threats.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Traditional static cybersecurity models often struggle with scalability, real-time detection, and contextual responsiveness in the current digital product ecosystems which include cloud services, application programming interfaces (APIs), mobile platforms, and edge devices. This study introduces autonomous goal driven agents capable of dynamic learning and context-aware decision making as part of an adaptive cybersecurity architecture driven by agentic artificial intelligence (AI). To facilitate autonomous threat mitigation, proactive policy enforcement, and real-time anomaly detection, this framework integrates agentic AI across the key ecosystem layers. Behavioral baselining, decentralized risk scoring, and federated threat intelligence sharing are important features. The capacity of the system to identify zero-day attacks and dynamically modify access policies was demonstrated through native cloud simulations. The evaluation results show increased adaptability, decreased response latency, and improved detection accuracy. The architecture provides an intelligent and scalable blueprint for safeguarding complex digital infrastructure and is compatible with zero-trust models, thereby supporting the adherence to international cybersecurity regulations.

The proliferation of IoT devices which can be more easily compromised than desktop computers has led to an increase in the occurrence of IoT based botnet attacks. In order to mitigate this new threat there is a need to develop new methods for detecting attacks launched from compromised IoT devices and differentiate between hour and millisecond long IoTbased attacks. In this paper we propose and empirically evaluate a novel network based anomaly detection method which extracts behavior snapshots of the network and uses deep autoencoders to detect anomalous network traffic emanating from compromised IoT devices. To evaluate our method, we infected nine commercial IoT devices in our lab with two of the most widely known IoT based botnets, Mirai and BASHLITE. Our evaluation results demonstrated our proposed method's ability to accurately and instantly detect the attacks as they were being launched from the compromised IoT devices which were part of a botnet.

Wireless sensor networks have attracted a lot of interest over the last decade in wireless and mobile computing research community. Applications of these networks are numerous and growing, which range from indoor deployment scenarios in the home and office to outdoor deployment in adversary's territory in a tactical battleground. However, due to distributed nature and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their performance. This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion on the state of the art in security technologies for wireless sensor networks. It identifies various possible attacks at different layers of the communication protocol stack in a typical sensor network and their possible countermeasures. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN security is also included.

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT