Daily Papers

Domestic AI agents faces ethical, autonomy, and inclusion challenges, particularly for overlooked groups like children, elderly, and Neurodivergent users. We present the Plural Voices Model (PVM), a novel single-agent framework that dynamically negotiates multi-user needs through real-time value alignment, leveraging diverse public datasets on mental health, eldercare, education, and moral reasoning. Using human+synthetic curriculum design with fairness-aware scenarios and ethical enhancements, PVM identifies core values, conflicts, and accessibility requirements to inform inclusive principles. Our privacy-focused prototype features adaptive safety scaffolds, tailored interactions (e.g., step-by-step guidance for Neurodivergent users, simple wording for children), and equitable conflict resolution. In preliminary evaluations, PVM outperforms multi-agent baselines in compliance (76% vs. 70%), fairness (90% vs. 85%), safety-violation rate (0% vs. 7%), and latency. Design innovations, including video guidance, autonomy sliders, family hubs, and adaptive safety dashboards, demonstrate new directions for ethical and inclusive domestic AI, for building user-centered agentic systems in plural domestic contexts. Our Codes and Model are been open sourced, available for reproduction: https://github.com/zade90/Agora

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

Scaffolding Large Language Models (LLMs) into multi-agent systems often improves performance on complex tasks, but the safety impact of such scaffolds has not been as thoroughly explored. In this paper, we introduce AGENTBREEDER a framework for multi-objective evolutionary search over scaffolds. Our REDAGENTBREEDER evolves scaffolds towards jailbreaking the base LLM while achieving high task success, while BLUEAGENTBREEDER instead aims to combine safety with task reward. We evaluate the systems discovered by the different instances of AGENTBREEDER and popular baselines using widely recognized reasoning, mathematics, and safety benchmarks. Our work highlights and mitigates the safety risks due to multi-agent scaffolding.

We propose a novel dynamic safety framework that optimizes language model (LM) safety reasoning at inference time without modifying model weights. Building on recent advances in self-critique methods, our approach leverages a meta-critique mechanism that iteratively updates safety prompts-termed specifications-to drive the critique and revision process adaptively. This test-time optimization not only improves performance against adversarial jailbreak requests but also in diverse general safety-related tasks, such as avoiding moral harm or pursuing honest responses. Our empirical evaluations across several language models demonstrate that dynamically optimized safety prompts yield significantly higher safety scores compared to fixed system prompts and static self-critique defenses. Code to be released at https://github.com/vicgalle/meta-self-critique.git .

We introduce RoboNinja, a learning-based cutting system for multi-material objects (i.e., soft objects with rigid cores such as avocados or mangos). In contrast to prior works using open-loop cutting actions to cut through single-material objects (e.g., slicing a cucumber), RoboNinja aims to remove the soft part of an object while preserving the rigid core, thereby maximizing the yield. To achieve this, our system closes the perception-action loop by utilizing an interactive state estimator and an adaptive cutting policy. The system first employs sparse collision information to iteratively estimate the position and geometry of an object's core and then generates closed-loop cutting actions based on the estimated state and a tolerance value. The "adaptiveness" of the policy is achieved through the tolerance value, which modulates the policy's conservativeness when encountering collisions, maintaining an adaptive safety distance from the estimated core. Learning such cutting skills directly on a real-world robot is challenging. Yet, existing simulators are limited in simulating multi-material objects or computing the energy consumption during the cutting process. To address this issue, we develop a differentiable cutting simulator that supports multi-material coupling and allows for the generation of optimized trajectories as demonstrations for policy learning. Furthermore, by using a low-cost force sensor to capture collision feedback, we were able to successfully deploy the learned model in real-world scenarios, including objects with diverse core geometries and soft materials.

The assessment of safety performance plays a pivotal role in the development and deployment of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). A common approach involves designing testing scenarios based on prior knowledge of CAVs (e.g., surrogate models), conducting tests in these scenarios, and subsequently evaluating CAVs' safety performances. However, substantial differences between CAVs and the prior knowledge can significantly diminish the evaluation efficiency. In response to this issue, existing studies predominantly concentrate on the adaptive design of testing scenarios during the CAV testing process. Yet, these methods have limitations in their applicability to high-dimensional scenarios. To overcome this challenge, we develop an adaptive testing environment that bolsters evaluation robustness by incorporating multiple surrogate models and optimizing the combination coefficients of these surrogate models to enhance evaluation efficiency. We formulate the optimization problem as a regression task utilizing quadratic programming. To efficiently obtain the regression target via reinforcement learning, we propose the dense reinforcement learning method and devise a new adaptive policy with high sample efficiency. Essentially, our approach centers on learning the values of critical scenes displaying substantial surrogate-to-real gaps. The effectiveness of our method is validated in high-dimensional overtaking scenarios, demonstrating that our approach achieves notable evaluation efficiency.

In this position paper, we address the persistent gap between rapidly growing AI capabilities and lagging safety progress. Existing paradigms divide into ``Make AI Safe'', which applies post-hoc alignment and guardrails but remains brittle and reactive, and ``Make Safe AI'', which emphasizes intrinsic safety but struggles to address unforeseen risks in open-ended environments. We therefore propose safe-by-coevolution as a new formulation of the ``Make Safe AI'' paradigm, inspired by biological immunity, in which safety becomes a dynamic, adversarial, and ongoing learning process. To operationalize this vision, we introduce R^2AI -- Resistant and Resilient AI -- as a practical framework that unites resistance against known threats with resilience to unforeseen risks. R^2AI integrates fast and slow safe models, adversarial simulation and verification through a safety wind tunnel, and continual feedback loops that guide safety and capability to coevolve. We argue that this framework offers a scalable and proactive path to maintain continual safety in dynamic environments, addressing both near-term vulnerabilities and long-term existential risks as AI advances toward AGI and ASI.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

Deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications requires robust safety guard models to detect and block harmful user prompts. While large safety guard models achieve strong performance, their computational cost is substantial. To mitigate this, smaller distilled models are used, but they often underperform on "hard" examples where the larger model provides accurate predictions. We observe that many inputs can be reliably handled by the smaller model, while only a small fraction require the larger model's capacity. Motivated by this, we propose SafeRoute, a binary router that distinguishes hard examples from easy ones. Our method selectively applies the larger safety guard model to the data that the router considers hard, improving efficiency while maintaining accuracy compared to solely using the larger safety guard model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our adaptive model selection significantly enhances the trade-off between computational cost and safety performance, outperforming relevant baselines.

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of 46.54% over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) typically generate identical or similar responses for all users given the same prompt, posing serious safety risks in high-stakes applications where user vulnerabilities differ widely. Existing safety evaluations primarily rely on context-independent metrics - such as factuality, bias, or toxicity - overlooking the fact that the same response may carry divergent risks depending on the user's background or condition. We introduce personalized safety to fill this gap and present PENGUIN - a benchmark comprising 14,000 scenarios across seven sensitive domains with both context-rich and context-free variants. Evaluating six leading LLMs, we demonstrate that personalized user information significantly improves safety scores by 43.2%, confirming the effectiveness of personalization in safety alignment. However, not all context attributes contribute equally to safety enhancement. To address this, we develop RAISE - a training-free, two-stage agent framework that strategically acquires user-specific background. RAISE improves safety scores by up to 31.6% over six vanilla LLMs, while maintaining a low interaction cost of just 2.7 user queries on average. Our findings highlight the importance of selective information gathering in safety-critical domains and offer a practical solution for personalizing LLM responses without model retraining. This work establishes a foundation for safety research that adapts to individual user contexts rather than assuming a universal harm standard.

Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) demonstrate impressive cross-modal reasoning but often amplify safety risks under adversarial or unsafe prompts, a phenomenon we call the Reasoning Tax. Existing defenses mainly act at the output level and do not constrain the reasoning process, leaving models exposed to implicit risks. In this paper, we propose SaFeR-VLM, a safety-aligned reinforcement learning framework that embeds safety directly into multimodal reasoning. The framework integrates four components: (I) QI-Safe-10K, a curated dataset emphasizing safety-critical and reasoning-sensitive cases; (II) safety-aware rollout, where unsafe generations undergo reflection and correction instead of being discarded; (III) structured reward modeling with multi-dimensional weighted criteria and explicit penalties for hallucinations and contradictions; and (IV) GRPO optimization, which reinforces both safe and corrected trajectories. This unified design shifts safety from a passive safeguard to an active driver of reasoning, enabling scalable and generalizable safety-aware reasoning. SaFeR-VLM further demonstrates robustness against both explicit and implicit risks, supporting dynamic and interpretable safety decisions beyond surface-level filtering. SaFeR-VLM-3B achieves average performance 70.13 and 78.97 on safety and helpfulness across six benchmarks, surpassing both same-scale and >10times larger models such as Skywork-R1V3-38B, Qwen2.5VL-72B, and GLM4.5V-106B. Remarkably, SaFeR-VLM-7B benefits from its increased scale to surpass GPT-5-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash by 6.47 and 16.76 points respectively on safety metrics, achieving this improvement without any degradation in helpfulness performance. Our codes are available at https://github.com/HarveyYi/SaFeR-VLM.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

Ensuring safety in reinforcement learning (RL)-based robotic systems is a critical challenge, especially in contact-rich tasks within unstructured environments. While the state-of-the-art safe RL approaches mitigate risks through safe exploration or high-level recovery mechanisms, they often overlook low-level execution safety, where reflexive responses to potential hazards are crucial. Similarly, variable impedance control (VIC) enhances safety by adjusting the robot's mechanical response, yet lacks a systematic way to adapt parameters, such as stiffness and damping throughout the task. In this paper, we propose Bresa, a Bio-inspired Reflexive Hierarchical Safe RL method inspired by biological reflexes. Our method decouples task learning from safety learning, incorporating a safety critic network that evaluates action risks and operates at a higher frequency than the task solver. Unlike existing recovery-based methods, our safety critic functions at a low-level control layer, allowing real-time intervention when unsafe conditions arise. The task-solving RL policy, running at a lower frequency, focuses on high-level planning (decision-making), while the safety critic ensures instantaneous safety corrections. We validate Bresa on multiple tasks including a contact-rich robotic task, demonstrating its reflexive ability to enhance safety, and adaptability in unforeseen dynamic environments. Our results show that Bresa outperforms the baseline, providing a robust and reflexive safety mechanism that bridges the gap between high-level planning and low-level execution. Real-world experiments and supplementary material are available at project website https://jack-sherman01.github.io/Bresa.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

Robotic systems operating in unstructured environments require the ability to switch between compliant and rigid states to perform diverse tasks such as adaptive grasping, high-force manipulation, shape holding, and navigation in constrained spaces, among others. However, many existing variable stiffness solutions rely on complex actuation schemes, continuous input power, or monolithic designs, limiting their modularity and scalability. This paper presents the Programmable Locking Cell (PLC)-a modular, tendon-driven unit that achieves discrete stiffness modulation through mechanically interlocked joints actuated by cable tension. Each unit transitions between compliant and firm states via structural engagement, and the assembled system exhibits high stiffness variation-up to 950% per unit-without susceptibility to damage under high payload in the firm state. Multiple PLC units can be assembled into reconfigurable robotic structures with spatially programmable stiffness. We validate the design through two functional prototypes: (1) a variable-stiffness gripper capable of adaptive grasping, firm holding, and in-hand manipulation; and (2) a pipe-traversing robot composed of serial PLC units that achieves shape adaptability and stiffness control in confined environments. These results demonstrate the PLC as a scalable, structure-centric mechanism for programmable stiffness and motion, enabling robotic systems with reconfigurable morphology and task-adaptive interaction.

As advancements in large language models (LLMs) continue and the demand for personalized models increases, parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods (e.g., LoRA) will become essential due to their efficiency in reducing computation costs. However, recent studies have raised alarming concerns that LoRA fine-tuning could potentially compromise the safety alignment in LLMs, posing significant risks for the model owner. In this paper, we first investigate the underlying mechanism by analyzing the changes in safety alignment related features before and after fine-tuning. Then, we propose a fixed safety module calculated by safety data and a task-specific initialization for trainable parameters in low-rank adaptations, termed Safety-alignment preserved Low-Rank Adaptation (SaLoRA). Unlike previous LoRA methods and their variants, SaLoRA enables targeted modifications to LLMs without disrupting their original alignments. Our experiments show that SaLoRA outperforms various adapters-based approaches across various evaluation metrics in different fine-tuning tasks.

Vision-Language adaptation (VL adaptation) transforms Large Language Models (LLMs) into Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) for multimodal tasks, but this process often compromises the inherent safety capabilities embedded in the original LLMs. Despite potential harmfulness due to weakened safety measures, in-depth analysis on the effects of VL adaptation on safety remains under-explored. This study examines how VL adaptation influences safety and evaluates the impact of safety fine-tuning methods. Our analysis reveals that safety degradation occurs during VL adaptation, even when the training data is safe. While safety tuning techniques like supervised fine-tuning with safety datasets or reinforcement learning from human feedback mitigate some risks, they still lead to safety degradation and a reduction in helpfulness due to over-rejection issues. Further analysis of internal model weights suggests that VL adaptation may impact certain safety-related layers, potentially lowering overall safety levels. Additionally, our findings demonstrate that the objectives of VL adaptation and safety tuning are divergent, which often results in their simultaneous application being suboptimal. To address this, we suggest the weight merging approach as an optimal solution effectively reducing safety degradation while maintaining helpfulness. These insights help guide the development of more reliable and secure LVLMs for real-world applications.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for downstream tasks is a widely adopted approach, but it often leads to safety degradation in safety-aligned LLMs. Currently, many solutions address this issue by incorporating additional safety data, which can be impractical in many cases. In this paper, we address the question: How can we improve downstream task performance while preserving safety in LLMs without relying on additional safety data? We propose a simple and effective method that maintains the inherent safety of LLMs while enhancing their downstream task performance: merging the weights of pre- and post-fine-tuned safety-aligned models. Experimental results across various downstream tasks, models, and merging methods demonstrate that this approach effectively mitigates safety degradation while improving downstream task performance, offering a practical solution for adapting safety-aligned LLMs.

Reasoning methods that adaptively allocate test-time compute have advanced LLM performance on easy to verify domains such as math and code. In this work, we study how to utilize this approach to train models that exhibit a degree of robustness to safety vulnerabilities, and show that doing so can provide benefits. We build a recipe called TARS (Training Adaptive Reasoners for Safety), a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains models to reason about safety using chain-of-thought traces and a reward signal that balances safety with task completion. To build TARS, we identify three critical design choices: (1) a "lightweight" warmstart SFT stage, (2) a mix of harmful, harmless, and ambiguous prompts to prevent shortcut behaviors such as too many refusals, and (3) a reward function to prevent degeneration of reasoning capabilities during training. Models trained with TARS exhibit adaptive behaviors by spending more compute on ambiguous queries, leading to better safety-refusal trade-offs. They also internally learn to better distinguish between safe and unsafe prompts and attain greater robustness to both white-box (e.g., GCG) and black-box attacks (e.g., PAIR). Overall, our work provides an effective, open recipe for training LLMs against jailbreaks and harmful requests by reasoning per prompt.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for telecom tasks and datasets is a common practice to adapt general-purpose models to the telecom domain. However, little attention has been paid to how this process may compromise model safety. Recent research has shown that even benign fine-tuning can degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, causing them to respond to harmful or unethical user queries. In this paper, we investigate this issue for telecom-tuned LLMs using three representative datasets featured by the GenAINet initiative. We show that safety degradation persists even for structured and seemingly harmless datasets such as 3GPP standards and tabular records, indicating that telecom-specific data is not immune to safety erosion during fine-tuning. We further extend our analysis to publicly available Telecom LLMs trained via continual pre-training, revealing that safety alignment is often severely lacking, primarily due to the omission of safety-focused instruction tuning. To address these issues in both fine-tuned and pre-trained models, we conduct extensive experiments and evaluate three safety realignment defenses (SafeInstruct, SafeLoRA, and SafeMERGE) using established red-teaming benchmarks. The results show that, across all settings, the proposed defenses can effectively restore safety after harmful degradation without compromising downstream task performance, leading to Safe teleCOMMunication (SafeCOMM) models. In a nutshell, our work serves as a diagnostic study and practical guide for safety realignment in telecom-tuned LLMs, and emphasizes the importance of safety-aware instruction and fine-tuning for real-world deployments of Telecom LLMs.

We propose patching for large language models (LLMs) like software versions, a lightweight and modular approach for addressing safety vulnerabilities. While vendors release improved LLM versions, major releases are costly, infrequent, and difficult to tailor to customer needs, leaving released models with known safety gaps. Unlike full-model fine-tuning or major version updates, our method enables rapid remediation by prepending a compact, learnable prefix to an existing model. This "patch" introduces only 0.003% additional parameters, yet reliably steers model behavior toward that of a safer reference model. Across three critical domains (toxicity mitigation, bias reduction, and harmfulness refusal) policy patches achieve safety improvements comparable to next-generation safety-aligned models while preserving fluency. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can be "patched" much like software, offering vendors and practitioners a practical mechanism for distributing scalable, efficient, and composable safety updates between major model releases.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. However, their deployment in safety-critical domains poses significant challenges. Existing safety fine-tuning methods, which focus on textual or multimodal content, fall short in addressing challenging cases or disrupt the balance between helpfulness and harmlessness. Our evaluation highlights a safety reasoning gap: these methods lack safety visual reasoning ability, leading to such bottlenecks. To address this limitation and enhance both visual perception and reasoning in safety-critical contexts, we propose a novel dataset that integrates multi-image inputs with safety Chain-of-Thought (CoT) labels as fine-grained reasoning logic to improve model performance. Specifically, we introduce the Multi-Image Safety (MIS) dataset, an instruction-following dataset tailored for multi-image safety scenarios, consisting of training and test splits. Our experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning InternVL2.5-8B with MIS significantly outperforms both powerful open-source models and API-based models in challenging multi-image tasks requiring safety-related visual reasoning. This approach not only delivers exceptional safety performance but also preserves general capabilities without any trade-offs. Specifically, fine-tuning with MIS increases average accuracy by 0.83% across five general benchmarks and reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) on multiple safety benchmarks by a large margin. Data and Models are released under: https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/{https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/}

Hospitals struggle to predict critical outcomes. Traditional early warning systems, like NEWS and MEWS, rely on static variables and fixed thresholds, limiting their adaptability, accuracy, and personalization. We previously developed the Enhanced Transformer for Health Outcome Simulation (ETHOS), an AI model that tokenizes patient health timelines (PHTs) from EHRs and uses transformer-based architectures to predict future PHTs. ETHOS is a versatile framework for developing a wide range of applications. In this work, we develop the Adaptive Risk Estimation System (ARES) that leverages ETHOS to compute dynamic, personalized risk probabilities for clinician-defined critical events. ARES also features a personalized explainability module that highlights key clinical factors influencing risk estimates. We evaluated ARES using the MIMIC-IV v2.2 dataset together with its Emergency Department (ED) extension and benchmarked performance against both classical early warning systems and contemporary machine learning models. The entire dataset was tokenized resulting in 285,622 PHTs, comprising over 360 million tokens. ETHOS outperformed benchmark models in predicting hospital admissions, ICU admissions, and prolonged stays, achieving superior AUC scores. Its risk estimates were robust across demographic subgroups, with calibration curves confirming model reliability. The explainability module provided valuable insights into patient-specific risk factors. ARES, powered by ETHOS, advances predictive healthcare AI by delivering dynamic, real-time, personalized risk estimation with patient-specific explainability. Although our results are promising, the clinical impact remains uncertain. Demonstrating ARES's true utility in real-world settings will be the focus of our future work. We release the source code to facilitate future research.

The current paradigm for safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) follows a one-size-fits-all approach: the model refuses to interact with any content deemed unsafe by the model provider. This approach lacks flexibility in the face of varying social norms across cultures and regions. In addition, users may have diverse safety needs, making a model with static safety standards too restrictive to be useful, as well as too costly to be re-aligned. We propose Controllable Safety Alignment (CoSA), a framework designed to adapt models to diverse safety requirements without re-training. Instead of aligning a fixed model, we align models to follow safety configs -- free-form natural language descriptions of the desired safety behaviors -- that are provided as part of the system prompt. To adjust model safety behavior, authorized users only need to modify such safety configs at inference time. To enable that, we propose CoSAlign, a data-centric method for aligning LLMs to easily adapt to diverse safety configs. Furthermore, we devise a novel controllability evaluation protocol that considers both helpfulness and configured safety, summarizing them into CoSA-Score, and construct CoSApien, a human-authored benchmark that consists of real-world LLM use cases with diverse safety requirements and corresponding evaluation prompts. We show that CoSAlign leads to substantial gains of controllability over strong baselines including in-context alignment. Our framework encourages better representation and adaptation to pluralistic human values in LLMs, and thereby increasing their practicality.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT and GPT-4, have demonstrated remarkable abilities in natural language understanding and generation. However, alongside their positive impact on our daily tasks, they can also produce harmful content that negatively affects societal perceptions. To systematically assess the safety of Chinese LLMs, we introduce SuperCLUE-Safety (SC-Safety) - a multi-round adversarial benchmark with 4912 open-ended questions covering more than 20 safety sub-dimensions. Adversarial human-model interactions and conversations significantly increase the challenges compared to existing methods. Experiments on 13 major LLMs supporting Chinese yield the following insights: 1) Closed-source models outperform open-sourced ones in terms of safety; 2) Models released from China demonstrate comparable safety levels to LLMs like GPT-3.5-turbo; 3) Some smaller models with 6B-13B parameters can compete effectively in terms of safety. By introducing SC-Safety, we aim to promote collaborative efforts to create safer and more trustworthy LLMs. The benchmark and findings provide guidance on model selection. Our benchmark can be found at https://www.CLUEbenchmarks.com

The open-world deployment of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles needs to address a variety of ML vulnerabilities such as interpretability, verifiability, and performance limitations. Research explores different approaches to improve ML dependability by proposing new models and training techniques to reduce generalization error, achieve domain adaptation, and detect outlier examples and adversarial attacks. However, there is a missing connection between ongoing ML research and well-established safety principles. In this paper, we present a structured and comprehensive review of ML techniques to improve the dependability of ML algorithms in uncontrolled open-world settings. From this review, we propose the Taxonomy of ML Safety that maps state-of-the-art ML techniques to key engineering safety strategies. Our taxonomy of ML safety presents a safety-oriented categorization of ML techniques to provide guidance for improving dependability of the ML design and development. The proposed taxonomy can serve as a safety checklist to aid designers in improving coverage and diversity of safety strategies employed in any given ML system.

Safety limitations in service robotics across various industries have raised significant concerns about the need for robust mechanisms ensuring that robots adhere to safe practices, thereby preventing actions that might harm humans or cause property damage. Despite advances, including the integration of Knowledge Graphs (KGs) with Large Language Models (LLMs), challenges in ensuring consistent safety in autonomous robot actions persist. In this paper, we propose a novel integration of Large Language Models with Embodied Robotic Control Prompts (ERCPs) and Embodied Knowledge Graphs (EKGs) to enhance the safety framework for service robots. ERCPs are designed as predefined instructions that ensure LLMs generate safe and precise responses. These responses are subsequently validated by EKGs, which provide a comprehensive knowledge base ensuring that the actions of the robot are continuously aligned with safety protocols, thereby promoting safer operational practices in varied contexts. Our experimental setup involved diverse real-world tasks, where robots equipped with our framework demonstrated significantly higher compliance with safety standards compared to traditional methods. This integration fosters secure human-robot interactions and positions our methodology at the forefront of AI-driven safety innovations in service robotics.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) extend large language models by generating explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, significantly improving mathematical and logical problem solving. However, this explicit reasoning process also introduces new safety risks, as unsafe behaviors often emerge within intermediate reasoning trajectories, even when final answers appear harmless. Existing safety alignment approaches primarily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) over safety-oriented long CoT datasets. While intuitive, we find that SFT produces inconsistent safety improvements, degrades reasoning ability, and generalizes poorly across model families. These limitations suggest that purely supervised approaches are insufficient for robust safety alignment in LRMs. To address this, we investigate reinforcement learning (RL) as a complementary optimization framework for LRM safety training. Unlike SFT, RL directly optimizes model policies with reward feedback, enabling more adaptive and stable alignment. Extensive experiments across multiple model families and benchmarks show that RL achieves stronger and more consistent safety gains while maintaining reasoning competence. Further analysis of reflection dynamics and token-level entropy reveals that RL suppresses unsafe exploratory reasoning while preserving reflective depth, leading to safer and more reliable reasoning processes.

Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit exceptional capabilities across various tasks but also pose risks by generating harmful content. Existing safety mechanisms, while improving model safety, often lead to overly cautious behavior and fail to fully leverage LLMs' internal cognitive processes. Inspired by humans' reflective thinking capability, we first show that LLMs can similarly perform internal assessments about safety in their internal states. Building on this insight, we propose SafeSwitch, a dynamic framework that regulates unsafe outputs by utilizing the prober-based internal state monitor that actively detects harmful intentions, and activates a safety head that leads to safer and more conservative responses only when necessary. SafeSwitch reduces harmful outputs by approximately 80% on harmful queries while maintaining strong utility, reaching a Pareto optimal among several methods. Our method is also advantageous over traditional methods in offering more informative, context-aware refusals, and achieves these benefits while only tuning less than 6% of the original parameters. SafeSwitch demonstrates large language models' capacity for self-awareness and reflection regarding safety, offering a promising approach to more nuanced and effective safety controls. Codes for this work are available at https://github.com/Hanpx20/SafeSwitch.

AI developers often apply safety alignment procedures to prevent the misuse of their AI systems. For example, before Meta released Llama 2-Chat, a collection of instruction fine-tuned large language models, they invested heavily in safety training, incorporating extensive red-teaming and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, it remains unclear how well safety training guards against model misuse when attackers have access to model weights. We explore the robustness of safety training in language models by subversively fine-tuning the public weights of Llama 2-Chat. We employ low-rank adaptation (LoRA) as an efficient fine-tuning method. With a budget of less than $200 per model and using only one GPU, we successfully undo the safety training of Llama 2-Chat models of sizes 7B, 13B, and 70B. Specifically, our fine-tuning technique significantly reduces the rate at which the model refuses to follow harmful instructions. We achieve a refusal rate below 1% for our 70B Llama 2-Chat model on two refusal benchmarks. Our fine-tuning method retains general performance, which we validate by comparing our fine-tuned models against Llama 2-Chat across two benchmarks. Additionally, we present a selection of harmful outputs produced by our models. While there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of risks from current models, it is likely that future models will have significantly more dangerous capabilities, including the ability to hack into critical infrastructure, create dangerous bio-weapons, or autonomously replicate and adapt to new environments. We show that subversive fine-tuning is practical and effective, and hence argue that evaluating risks from fine-tuning should be a core part of risk assessments for releasing model weights.

The current safeguard mechanisms for large language models (LLMs) are indeed susceptible to jailbreak attacks, making them inherently fragile. Even the process of fine-tuning on apparently benign data for downstream tasks can jeopardize safety. One potential solution is to conduct safety fine-tuning subsequent to downstream fine-tuning. However, there's a risk of catastrophic forgetting during safety fine-tuning, where LLMs may regain safety measures but lose the task-specific knowledge acquired during downstream fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce a safety realignment framework through subspace-oriented model fusion (SOMF), aiming to combine the safeguard capabilities of initially aligned model and the current fine-tuned model into a realigned model. Our approach begins by disentangling all task vectors from the weights of each fine-tuned model. We then identify safety-related regions within these vectors by subspace masking techniques. Finally, we explore the fusion of the initial safely aligned LLM with all task vectors based on the identified safety subspace. We validate that our safety realignment framework satisfies the safety requirements of a single fine-tuned model as well as multiple models during their fusion. Our findings confirm that SOMF preserves safety without notably compromising performance on downstream tasks, including instruction following in Chinese, English, and Hindi, as well as problem-solving capabilities in Code and Math.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and widely used, ensuring the safety of their outputs is increasingly critical. Existing guardrail models, though useful in static evaluation settings, face two major limitations in real-world applications: (1) they typically output only binary "safe/unsafe" labels, which can be interpreted inconsistently across diverse safety policies, rendering them incapable of accommodating varying safety tolerances across domains; and (2) they require complete model outputs before performing safety checks, making them fundamentally incompatible with streaming LLM inference, thereby preventing timely intervention during generation and increasing exposure to harmful partial outputs. To address these challenges, we present Qwen3Guard, a series of multilingual safety guardrail models with two specialized variants: Generative Qwen3Guard, which casts safety classification as an instruction-following task to enable fine-grained tri-class judgments (safe, controversial, unsafe); and Stream Qwen3Guard, which introduces a token-level classification head for real-time safety monitoring during incremental text generation. Both variants are available in three sizes (0.6B, 4B, and 8B parameters) and support up to 119 languages and dialects, providing comprehensive, scalable, and low-latency safety moderation for global LLM deployments. Evaluated across English, Chinese, and multilingual benchmarks, Qwen3Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance in both prompt and response safety classification. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Text-to-image (T2I) models are widespread, but their limited safety guardrails expose end users to harmful content and potentially allow for model misuse. Current safety measures are typically limited to text-based filtering or concept removal strategies, able to remove just a few concepts from the model's generative capabilities. In this work, we introduce AlignGuard, a method for safety alignment of T2I models. We enable the application of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) for safety purposes in T2I models by synthetically generating a dataset of harmful and safe image-text pairs, which we call CoProV2. Using a custom DPO strategy and this dataset, we train safety experts, in the form of low-rank adaptation (LoRA) matrices, able to guide the generation process away from specific safety-related concepts. Then, we merge the experts into a single LoRA using a novel merging strategy for optimal scaling performance. This expert-based approach enables scalability, allowing us to remove 7x more harmful concepts from T2I models compared to baselines. AlignGuard consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art on many benchmarks and establishes new practices for safety alignment in T2I networks. Code and data will be shared at https://safetydpo.github.io/.

State-of-the-art language model fine-tuning techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), restrict user control by hard-coding predefined behaviors into the model. To address this, we propose a novel method, Configurable Safety Tuning (CST), that augments DPO using synthetic preference data to facilitate flexible safety configuration of LLMs at inference time. CST overcomes the constraints of vanilla DPO by introducing a system prompt specifying safety configurations, enabling LLM deployers to disable/enable safety preferences based on their need, just changing the system prompt. Our experimental evaluations indicate that CST successfully manages different safety configurations and retains the original functionality of LLMs, showing it is a robust method for configurable deployment. Data and models available at https://github.com/vicgalle/configurable-safety-tuning

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Ensuring safety in Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically framed as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), is crucial for real-world exploration applications. Current approaches in handling CMDP struggle to balance optimality and feasibility, as direct optimization methods cannot ensure state-wise in-training safety, and projection-based methods correct actions inefficiently through lengthy iterations. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Chance-constrained Safeguards (ACS), an adaptive, model-free safe RL algorithm using the safety recovery rate as a surrogate chance constraint to iteratively ensure safety during exploration and after achieving convergence. Theoretical analysis indicates that the relaxed probabilistic constraint sufficiently guarantees forward invariance to the safe set. And extensive experiments conducted on both simulated and real-world safety-critical tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in enforcing safety (nearly zero-violation) while preserving optimality (+23.8%), robustness, and fast response in stochastic real-world settings.

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) with Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) enhances adaptability while reducing computational costs. However, fine-tuning can compromise safety alignment, even with benign data, increasing susceptibility to harmful outputs. Existing safety alignment methods struggle to capture complex parameter shifts, leading to suboptimal safety-utility trade-offs. To address this issue, we propose Safe Pruning LoRA (SPLoRA), a novel pruning-based approach that selectively removes LoRA layers that weaken safety alignment, improving safety while preserving performance. At its core, we introduce Empirical-DIEM (E-DIEM), a dimension-insensitive similarity metric that effectively detects safety misalignment in LoRA-adapted models. We conduct extensive experiments on LLMs fine-tuned with mixed of benign and malicious data, and purely benign datasets, evaluating SPLoRA across utility, safety, and reliability metrics. Results demonstrate that SPLoRA outperforms state-of-the-art safety alignment techniques, significantly reducing safety risks while maintaining or improving model performance and reliability. Additionally, SPLoRA reduces inference overhead, making it a scalable and efficient solution for deploying safer and more reliable LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/AoShuang92/SPLoRA.

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

This paper presents a safety-critical control framework tailored for quadruped robots equipped with a roller arm, particularly when performing locomotive tasks such as autonomous robotic inspection in complex, multi-tiered environments. In this study, we consider the problem of operating a quadrupedal robot in distillation columns, locomoting on column trays and transitioning between these trays with a roller arm. To address this problem, our framework encompasses the following key elements: 1) Trajectory generation for seamless transitions between columns, 2) Foothold re-planning in regions deemed unsafe, 3) Safety-critical control incorporating control barrier functions, 4) Gait transitions based on safety levels, and 5) A low-level controller. Our comprehensive framework, comprising these components, enables autonomous and safe locomotion across multiple layers. We incorporate reduced-order and full-body models to ensure safety, integrating safety-critical control and footstep re-planning approaches. We validate the effectiveness of our proposed framework through practical experiments involving a quadruped robot equipped with a roller arm, successfully navigating and transitioning between different levels within the column tray structure.

Generative AI systems produce a range of risks. To ensure the safety of generative AI systems, these risks must be evaluated. In this paper, we make two main contributions toward establishing such evaluations. First, we propose a three-layered framework that takes a structured, sociotechnical approach to evaluating these risks. This framework encompasses capability evaluations, which are the main current approach to safety evaluation. It then reaches further by building on system safety principles, particularly the insight that context determines whether a given capability may cause harm. To account for relevant context, our framework adds human interaction and systemic impacts as additional layers of evaluation. Second, we survey the current state of safety evaluation of generative AI systems and create a repository of existing evaluations. Three salient evaluation gaps emerge from this analysis. We propose ways forward to closing these gaps, outlining practical steps as well as roles and responsibilities for different actors. Sociotechnical safety evaluation is a tractable approach to the robust and comprehensive safety evaluation of generative AI systems.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to harmful input compared to their language-only backbones. We investigated this vulnerability by exploring LVLMs internal dynamics, framing their inherent safety understanding in terms of three key capabilities. Specifically, we define these capabilities as safety perception, semantic understanding, and alignment for linguistic expression, and experimentally pinpointed their primary locations within the model architecture. The results indicate that safety perception often emerges before comprehensive semantic understanding, leading to the reduction in safety. Motivated by these findings, we propose Self-Aware Safety Augmentation (SASA), a technique that projects informative semantic representations from intermediate layers onto earlier safety-oriented layers. This approach leverages the model's inherent semantic understanding to enhance safety recognition without fine-tuning. Then, we employ linear probing to articulate the model's internal semantic comprehension to detect the risk before the generation process. Extensive experiments on various datasets and tasks demonstrate that SASA significantly improves the safety of LVLMs, with minimal impact on the utility.

LLMs(Large Language Models) nowadays have widespread adoption as a tool for solving issues across various domain/tasks. These models since are susceptible to produce harmful or toxic results, inference-time adversarial attacks, therefore they do undergo safety alignment training and Red teaming for putting in safety guardrails. For using these models, usually fine-tuning is done for model alignment on the desired tasks, which can make model more aligned but also make it more susceptible to produce unsafe responses, if fine-tuned with harmful data.In this paper, we study how much of impact introduction of harmful data in fine-tuning can make, and if it can override the safety protection of those models. Conversely,it was also explored that if model is fine-tuned on safety data can make the model produce more safer responses. Further we explore if fine-tuning the model on harmful data makes it less helpful or less trustworthy because of increase in model uncertainty leading to knowledge drift. Our extensive experimental results shown that Safety protection in an open-source can be overridden, when fine-tuned with harmful data as observed by ASR increasing by 35% when compared to basemodel's ASR. Also, as observed, fine-tuning a model with harmful data made the harmful fine-tuned model highly uncertain with huge knowledge drift and less truthfulness in its responses. Furthermore, for the safe fine-tuned model, ASR decreases by 51.68% as compared to the basemodel, and Safe model also shown in minor drop in uncertainty and truthfulness as compared to basemodel. This paper's code is available at: https://github.com/techsachinkr/Overriding_Model_Safety_Protections

The increasing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) across enterprise and mission-critical domains has underscored the urgent need for robust guardrailing systems that ensure safety, reliability, and compliance. Existing solutions often struggle with real-time oversight, multi-modal data handling, and explainability -- limitations that hinder their adoption in regulated environments. Existing guardrails largely operate in isolation, focused on text alone making them inadequate for multi-modal, production-scale environments. We introduce Protect, natively multi-modal guardrailing model designed to operate seamlessly across text, image, and audio inputs, designed for enterprise-grade deployment. Protect integrates fine-tuned, category-specific adapters trained via Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) on an extensive, multi-modal dataset covering four safety dimensions: toxicity, sexism, data privacy, and prompt injection. Our teacher-assisted annotation pipeline leverages reasoning and explanation traces to generate high-fidelity, context-aware labels across modalities. Experimental results demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across all safety dimensions, surpassing existing open and proprietary models such as WildGuard, LlamaGuard-4, and GPT-4.1. Protect establishes a strong foundation for trustworthy, auditable, and production-ready safety systems capable of operating across text, image, and audio modalities.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

Medical systematic reviews can be very costly and resource intensive. We explore how Large Language Models (LLMs) can support and be trained to perform literature screening when provided with a detailed set of selection criteria. Specifically, we instruction tune LLaMA and Guanaco models to perform abstract screening for medical systematic reviews. Our best model, Bio-SIEVE, outperforms both ChatGPT and trained traditional approaches, and generalises better across medical domains. However, there remains the challenge of adapting the model to safety-first scenarios. We also explore the impact of multi-task training with Bio-SIEVE-Multi, including tasks such as PICO extraction and exclusion reasoning, but find that it is unable to match single-task Bio-SIEVE's performance. We see Bio-SIEVE as an important step towards specialising LLMs for the biomedical systematic review process and explore its future developmental opportunities. We release our models, code and a list of DOIs to reconstruct our dataset for reproducibility.

The study of representation universality in AI models reveals growing convergence across domains, modalities, and architectures. However, the practical applications of representation universality remain largely unexplored. We bridge this gap by demonstrating that safety interventions can be transferred between models through learned mappings of their shared activation spaces. We demonstrate this approach on two well-established AI safety tasks: backdoor removal and refusal of harmful prompts, showing successful transfer of steering vectors that alter the models' outputs in a predictable way. Additionally, we propose a new task, corrupted capabilities, where models are fine-tuned to embed knowledge tied to a backdoor. This tests their ability to separate useful skills from backdoors, reflecting real-world challenges. Extensive experiments across Llama, Qwen and Gemma model families show that our method enables using smaller models to efficiently align larger ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that autoencoder mappings between base and fine-tuned models can serve as reliable ``lightweight safety switches", allowing dynamic toggling between model behaviors.

Ensuring content safety in large language models (LLMs) is essential for their deployment in real-world applications. However, existing safety guardrails are predominantly tailored for high-resource languages, leaving a significant portion of the world's population underrepresented who communicate in low-resource languages. To address this, we introduce CREST (CRoss-lingual Efficient Safety Transfer), a parameter-efficient multilingual safety classification model that supports 100 languages with only 0.5B parameters. By training on a strategically chosen subset of only 13 high-resource languages, our model utilizes cluster-based cross-lingual transfer from a few to 100 languages, enabling effective generalization to both unseen high-resource and low-resource languages. This approach addresses the challenge of limited training data in low-resource settings. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across six safety benchmarks to demonstrate that CREST outperforms existing state-of-the-art guardrails of comparable scale and achieves competitive results against models with significantly larger parameter counts (2.5B parameters and above). Our findings highlight the limitations of language-specific guardrails and underscore the importance of developing universal, language-agnostic safety systems that can scale effectively to serve global populations.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

We report a mixture of expert strategy to create fine-tuned large language models using a deep layer-wise token-level approach based on low-rank adaptation (LoRA). Starting with a set of pre-trained LoRA adapters, we propose a gating strategy that uses the hidden states to dynamically mix adapted layers, allowing the resulting X-LoRA model to draw upon different capabilities and create never-before-used deep layer-wise combinations of adaptations are established to solve specific tasks. The design is inspired by the biological principles of universality and diversity, where neural network building blocks are reused in different hierarchical manifestations. Hence, the X-LoRA model can be easily implemented for any existing large language model (LLM) without a need for modifications of the underlying structure. We develop a tailored X-LoRA model that offers scientific capabilities including forward/inverse analysis tasks and enhanced reasoning capability, focused on biomaterial analysis, protein mechanics and design. The impact of this work include access to readily expandable, adaptable and changeable models with strong domain knowledge and the capability to integrate across areas of knowledge. With the X-LoRA model featuring experts in biology, mathematics, reasoning, bio-inspired materials, mechanics and materials, chemistry, and protein mechanics we conduct a series of physics-focused case studies. We examine knowledge recall, protein mechanics forward/inverse tasks, protein design, and adversarial agentic modeling including ontological knowledge graphs. The model is capable not only of making quantitative predictions of nanomechanical properties of proteins, but also reasons over the results and correctly predicts likely mechanisms that explain distinct molecular behaviors.

Ensuring the safety and reliability of large language models (LLMs) in clinical practice is critical to prevent patient harm and promote trustworthy healthcare applications of AI. However, LLMs are advancing so rapidly that static safety benchmarks often become obsolete upon publication, yielding only an incomplete and sometimes misleading picture of model trustworthiness. We demonstrate that a Dynamic, Automatic, and Systematic (DAS) red-teaming framework that continuously stress-tests LLMs can reveal significant weaknesses of current LLMs across four safety-critical domains: robustness, privacy, bias/fairness, and hallucination. A suite of adversarial agents is applied to autonomously mutate test cases, identify/evolve unsafe-triggering strategies, and evaluate responses, uncovering vulnerabilities in real time without human intervention. Applying DAS to 15 proprietary and open-source LLMs revealed a stark contrast between static benchmark performance and vulnerability under adversarial pressure. Despite a median MedQA accuracy exceeding 80\%, 94\% of previously correct answers failed our dynamic robustness tests. We observed similarly high failure rates across other domains: privacy leaks were elicited in 86\% of scenarios, cognitive-bias priming altered clinical recommendations in 81\% of fairness tests, and we identified hallucination rates exceeding 66\% in widely used models. Such profound residual risks are incompatible with routine clinical practice. By converting red-teaming from a static checklist into a dynamic stress-test audit, DAS red-teaming offers the surveillance that hospitals/regulators/technology vendors require as LLMs become embedded in patient chatbots, decision-support dashboards, and broader healthcare workflows. Our framework delivers an evolvable, scalable, and reliable safeguard for the next generation of medical AI.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on reasoning-intensive tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, their enhanced reasoning capabilities do not necessarily translate to improved safety performance-and in some cases, may even degrade it. This raises an important research question: how can we enhance the safety of LRMs? In this paper, we present a comprehensive empirical study on how to enhance the safety of LRMs through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Our investigation begins with an unexpected observation: directly distilling safe responses from DeepSeek-R1 fails to significantly enhance safety. We analyze this phenomenon and identify three key failure patterns that contribute to it. We then demonstrate that explicitly addressing these issues during the data distillation process can lead to substantial safety improvements. Next, we explore whether a long and complex reasoning process is necessary for achieving safety. Interestingly, we find that simply using short or template-based reasoning process can attain comparable safety performance-and are significantly easier for models to learn than more intricate reasoning chains. These findings prompt a deeper reflection on the role of reasoning in ensuring safety. Finally, we find that mixing math reasoning data during safety fine-tuning is helpful to balance safety and over-refusal. Overall, we hope our empirical study could provide a more holistic picture on enhancing the safety of LRMs. The code and data used in our experiments are released in https://github.com/thu-coai/LRM-Safety-Study.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) "think" by generating structured chain-of-thought (CoT) before producing a final answer, yet they still lack the ability to reason critically about safety alignment and are easily biased when a flawed premise is injected into their thought process. We propose RECAP (Robust Safety Alignment via Counter-Aligned Prefilling), a principled reinforcement learning (RL) method for post-training that explicitly teaches models to override flawed reasoning trajectories and reroute to safe and helpful responses. RECAP trains on a mixture of synthetically generated counter-aligned CoT prefills and standard prompts, requires no additional training cost or modifications beyond vanilla reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), and substantially improves safety and jailbreak robustness, reduces overrefusal, and preserves core reasoning capability -- all while maintaining inference token budget. Extensive analysis shows that RECAP-trained models engage in self-reflection more frequently and remain robust under adaptive attacks, preserving safety even after repeated attempts to override their reasoning.

Text-to-image diffusion models have revolutionized visual content generation, but current safety mechanisms apply uniform standards that often fail to account for individual user preferences. These models overlook the diverse safety boundaries shaped by factors like age, mental health, and personal beliefs. To address this, we propose Personalized Safety Alignment (PSA), a framework that allows user-specific control over safety behaviors in generative models. PSA integrates personalized user profiles into the diffusion process, adjusting the model's behavior to match individual safety preferences while preserving image quality. We introduce a new dataset, Sage, which captures user-specific safety preferences and incorporates these profiles through a cross-attention mechanism. Experiments show that PSA outperforms existing methods in harmful content suppression and aligns generated content better with user constraints, achieving higher Win Rate and Pass Rate scores. Our code, data, and models are publicly available at https://torpedo2648.github.io/PSAlign/.

Many machine learning models are fine-tuned from large language models (LLMs) to achieve high performance in specialized domains like code generation, biomedical analysis, and mathematical problem solving. However, this fine-tuning process often introduces a critical vulnerability: the systematic degradation of safety alignment, undermining ethical guidelines and increasing the risk of harmful outputs. Addressing this challenge, we introduce EnchTable, a novel framework designed to transfer and maintain safety alignment in downstream LLMs without requiring extensive retraining. EnchTable leverages a Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK)-based safety vector distillation method to decouple safety constraints from task-specific reasoning, ensuring compatibility across diverse model architectures and sizes. Additionally, our interference-aware merging technique effectively balances safety and utility, minimizing performance compromises across various task domains. We implemented a fully functional prototype of EnchTable on three different task domains and three distinct LLM architectures, and evaluated its performance through extensive experiments on eleven diverse datasets, assessing both utility and model safety. Our evaluations include LLMs from different vendors, demonstrating EnchTable's generalization capability. Furthermore, EnchTable exhibits robust resistance to static and dynamic jailbreaking attacks, outperforming vendor-released safety models in mitigating adversarial prompts. Comparative analyses with six parameter modification methods and two inference-time alignment baselines reveal that EnchTable achieves a significantly lower unsafe rate, higher utility score, and universal applicability across different task domains. Additionally, we validate EnchTable can be seamlessly integrated into various deployment pipelines without significant overhead.

Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is a powerful but computationally intensive method for simulating physical phenomena. Recent advancements in machine learning have led to surrogate models capable of accelerating FEA. Yet there are still limitations in developing surrogates of transient FEA models that can simultaneously predict the solutions for both nodes and elements with applicability on both the 2D and 3D domains. Motivated by this research gap, this study proposes DeepFEA, a deep learning-based framework that leverages a multilayer Convolutional Long Short-Term Memory (ConvLSTM) network branching into two parallel convolutional neural networks to predict the solutions for both nodes and elements of FEA models. The proposed network is optimized using a novel adaptive learning algorithm, called Node-Element Loss Optimization (NELO). NELO minimizes the error occurring at both branches of the network enabling the prediction of solutions for transient FEA simulations. The experimental evaluation of DeepFEA is performed on three datasets in the context of structural mechanics, generated to serve as publicly available reference datasets. The results show that DeepFEA can achieve less than 3% normalized mean and root mean squared error for 2D and 3D simulation scenarios, and inference times that are two orders of magnitude faster than FEA. In contrast, relevant state-of-the-art methods face challenges with multi-dimensional output and dynamic input prediction. Furthermore, DeepFEA's robustness was demonstrated in a real-life biomedical scenario, confirming its suitability for accurate and efficient predictions of FEA simulations.

Although large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities on complex tasks, recent studies reveal that these models frequently fulfill harmful user instructions, raising significant safety concerns. In this paper, we investigate the underlying cause of LRM safety risks and find that models already possess sufficient safety knowledge but fail to activate it during reasoning. Based on this insight, we propose R1-Act, a simple and efficient post-training method that explicitly triggers safety knowledge through a structured reasoning process. R1-Act achieves strong safety improvements while preserving reasoning performance, outperforming prior alignment methods. Notably, it requires only 1,000 training examples and 90 minutes of training on a single RTX A6000 GPU. Extensive experiments across multiple LRM backbones and sizes demonstrate the robustness, scalability, and practical efficiency of our approach.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into numerous applications across various domains, LLMs' safety becomes a critical concern for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between safe and unsafe, or constrained by the narrow risk taxonomies of a single benchmark. To leverage these fine-grained safety taxonomies across multiple safety benchmarks, in this paper, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe input prompts and LLMs' outputs with violated safety taxonomies through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, our GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through our careful cold-start strategy and reward design. Consequently, our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that our GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, our GSPR not only demonstrates powerful safety generalization abilities but also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

Advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled a new class of self-evolving agents that autonomously improve through interaction with the environment, demonstrating strong capabilities. However, self-evolution also introduces novel risks overlooked by current safety research. In this work, we study the case where an agent's self-evolution deviates in unintended ways, leading to undesirable or even harmful outcomes. We refer to this as Misevolution. To provide a systematic investigation, we evaluate misevolution along four key evolutionary pathways: model, memory, tool, and workflow. Our empirical findings reveal that misevolution is a widespread risk, affecting agents built even on top-tier LLMs (e.g., Gemini-2.5-Pro). Different emergent risks are observed in the self-evolutionary process, such as the degradation of safety alignment after memory accumulation, or the unintended introduction of vulnerabilities in tool creation and reuse. To our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically conceptualize misevolution and provide empirical evidence of its occurrence, highlighting an urgent need for new safety paradigms for self-evolving agents. Finally, we discuss potential mitigation strategies to inspire further research on building safer and more trustworthy self-evolving agents. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/ShaoShuai0605/Misevolution . Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful in nature.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have accelerated progress toward artificial general intelligence, yet their potential to generate harmful content poses critical safety challenges. Existing alignment methods often struggle to cover diverse safety scenarios and remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this work, we propose Ex-Ante Reasoning Preference Optimization (ERPO), a novel safety alignment framework that equips LLMs with explicit preemptive reasoning through Chain-of-Thought and provides clear evidence for safety judgments by embedding predefined safety rules. Specifically, our approach consists of three stages: first, equipping the model with Ex-Ante reasoning through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using a constructed reasoning module; second, enhancing safety, usefulness, and efficiency via Direct Preference Optimization (DPO); and third, mitigating inference latency with a length-controlled iterative preference optimization strategy. Experiments on multiple open-source LLMs demonstrate that ERPO significantly enhances safety performance while maintaining response efficiency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools, but their inherent safety risks - ranging from harmful content generation to broader societal harms - pose significant challenges. These risks can be amplified by the recent adversarial attacks, fine-tuning vulnerabilities, and the increasing deployment of LLMs in high-stakes environments. Existing safety-enhancing techniques, such as fine-tuning with human feedback or adversarial training, are still vulnerable as they address specific threats and often fail to generalize across unseen attacks, or require manual system-level defenses. This paper introduces RepBend, a novel approach that fundamentally disrupts the representations underlying harmful behaviors in LLMs, offering a scalable solution to enhance (potentially inherent) safety. RepBend brings the idea of activation steering - simple vector arithmetic for steering model's behavior during inference - to loss-based fine-tuning. Through extensive evaluation, RepBend achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming prior methods such as Circuit Breaker, RMU, and NPO, with up to 95% reduction in attack success rates across diverse jailbreak benchmarks, all with negligible reduction in model usability and general capabilities.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

Optimizing large language models (LLMs) for downstream use cases often involves the customization of pre-trained LLMs through further fine-tuning. Meta's open release of Llama models and OpenAI's APIs for fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo on custom datasets also encourage this practice. But, what are the safety costs associated with such custom fine-tuning? We note that while existing safety alignment infrastructures can restrict harmful behaviors of LLMs at inference time, they do not cover safety risks when fine-tuning privileges are extended to end-users. Our red teaming studies find that the safety alignment of LLMs can be compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. For instance, we jailbreak GPT-3.5 Turbo's safety guardrails by fine-tuning it on only 10 such examples at a cost of less than $0.20 via OpenAI's APIs, making the model responsive to nearly any harmful instructions. Disconcertingly, our research also reveals that, even without malicious intent, simply fine-tuning with benign and commonly used datasets can also inadvertently degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, though to a lesser extent. These findings suggest that fine-tuning aligned LLMs introduces new safety risks that current safety infrastructures fall short of addressing -- even if a model's initial safety alignment is impeccable, it is not necessarily to be maintained after custom fine-tuning. We outline and critically analyze potential mitigations and advocate for further research efforts toward reinforcing safety protocols for the custom fine-tuning of aligned LLMs.

Neural rendering methods have significantly advanced photo-realistic 3D scene rendering in various academic and industrial applications. The recent 3D Gaussian Splatting method has achieved the state-of-the-art rendering quality and speed combining the benefits of both primitive-based representations and volumetric representations. However, it often leads to heavily redundant Gaussians that try to fit every training view, neglecting the underlying scene geometry. Consequently, the resulting model becomes less robust to significant view changes, texture-less area and lighting effects. We introduce Scaffold-GS, which uses anchor points to distribute local 3D Gaussians, and predicts their attributes on-the-fly based on viewing direction and distance within the view frustum. Anchor growing and pruning strategies are developed based on the importance of neural Gaussians to reliably improve the scene coverage. We show that our method effectively reduces redundant Gaussians while delivering high-quality rendering. We also demonstrates an enhanced capability to accommodate scenes with varying levels-of-detail and view-dependent observations, without sacrificing the rendering speed.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning models on a narrow domain with misaligned data can lead to broad misalignment - a phenomenon termed "emergent misalignment" (Betley et al. 2025). While all tested models were susceptible to emergent misalignment, some models showed more resistance than others. Specifically the Qwen-2.5 family proved to be relatively resistant, while GPT-4o exhibited the strongest misalignment. In this paper we evaluate if current-generation open-weights models exhibit similar resistance to the Qwen-2.5 family and measure misalignment robustness over a range of model architectures and scales. We replicate the effect across nine modern open-weights models (Gemma 3 and Qwen 3 families, 1B-32B parameters). Models fine-tuned on insecure code generation show a 0.68% misalignment rate (compared to 0.07% for base models), matching the lower end of prior open-model results but dramatically lower than GPT-4o's 20%. We identify a critical format-dependent vulnerability: requiring JSON output doubles misalignment rates compared to natural language prompts (0.96% vs 0.42%). This suggests that structural constraints may bypass safety training by reducing the model's 'degrees of freedom' to refuse. These findings confirm emergent misalignment as a reproducible phenomenon in modern open-weights models, with rates substantially lower than observed in proprietary systems.

In addressing the critical need for safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), it is crucial to ensure that the outputs are not only safe but also retain their contextual accuracy. Many existing LLMs are safe fine-tuned either with safety demonstrations, or rely only on adversarial testing. While able to get safe outputs, they often risk losing contextual meaning as they mitigate bias and toxicity. In response, we present MBIAS, a LLM framework instruction fine-tuned on a custom dataset specifically designed for safety interventions. MBIAS aims to address the significant issues of bias and toxicity in LLMs generations that typically manifest as underrepresentation or negative portrayals across various demographics, including inappropriate linguistic mentions and biased content in social media. We experiment on MBIAS for safety interventions using various configurations, and demonstrate more than a 30\% reduction in overall bias and toxicity while successfully retaining key information. Additionally, a demographic analysis on an out-of-distribution test set confirms the robustness of our approach, with reductions in bias and toxicity exceeding 90\% across various demographics. The dataset and instruction fine-tuned MBIAS are made available to the research community at https://huggingface.co/newsmediabias/MBIAS.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in critical domains like healthcare, justice, and social services has sparked numerous regulatory initiatives aimed at ensuring their safe deployment. Current regulatory frameworks, exemplified by recent US and EU efforts, primarily focus on procedural guidelines while presuming that scientific benchmarking can effectively validate AI safety, similar to how crash tests verify vehicle safety or clinical trials validate drug efficacy. However, this approach fundamentally misunderstands the unique technical challenges posed by modern AI systems. Through systematic analysis of successful technology regulation case studies, we demonstrate that effective scientific regulation requires a causal theory linking observable test outcomes to future performance - for instance, how a vehicle's crash resistance at one speed predicts its safety at lower speeds. We show that deep learning models, which learn complex statistical patterns from training data without explicit causal mechanisms, preclude such guarantees. This limitation renders traditional regulatory approaches inadequate for ensuring AI safety. Moving forward, we call for regulators to reckon with this limitation, and propose a preliminary two-tiered regulatory framework that acknowledges these constraints: mandating human oversight for high-risk applications while developing appropriate risk communication strategies for lower-risk uses. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider fundamental assumptions in AI regulation and suggest a concrete path forward for policymakers and researchers.

Although large language models (LLMs) achieve effective safety alignment at the time of release, they still face various safety challenges. A key issue is that fine-tuning often compromises the safety alignment of LLMs. To address this issue, we propose a method named IRR (Identify, Remove, and Recalibrate for Safety Realignment) that performs safety realignment for LLMs. The core of IRR is to identify and remove unsafe delta parameters from the fine-tuned models, while recalibrating the retained ones. We evaluate the effectiveness of IRR across various datasets, including both full fine-tuning and LoRA methods. Our results demonstrate that IRR significantly enhances the safety performance of fine-tuned models on safety benchmarks, such as harmful queries and jailbreak attacks, while maintaining their performance on downstream tasks. The source code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/IRR-BD4F.

The industrial application motivating this work is the fatigue computation of aircraft engines' high-pressure turbine blades. The material model involves nonlinear elastoviscoplastic behavior laws, for which the parameters depend on the temperature. For this application, the temperature loading is not accurately known and can reach values relatively close to the creep temperature: important nonlinear effects occur and the solution strongly depends on the used thermal loading. We consider a nonlinear reduced order model able to compute, in the exploitation phase, the behavior of the blade for a new temperature field loading. The sensitivity of the solution to the temperature makes {the classical unenriched proper orthogonal decomposition method} fail. In this work, we propose a new error indicator, quantifying the error made by the reduced order model in computational complexity independent of the size of the high-fidelity reference model. In our framework, when the {error indicator} becomes larger than a given tolerance, the reduced order model is updated using one time step solution of the high-fidelity reference model. The approach is illustrated on a series of academic test cases and applied on a setting of industrial complexity involving 5 million degrees of freedom, where the whole procedure is computed in parallel with distributed memory.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically aligned for safety during the post-training phase; however, they may still generate inappropriate outputs that could potentially pose risks to users. This challenge underscores the need for robust safeguards that operate across both model inputs and outputs. In this work, we introduce Roblox Guard 1.0, a state-of-the-art instruction fine-tuned LLM designed to enhance the safety of LLM systems through comprehensive input-output moderation, using a pipeline of LLMs to enhance moderation capability. Built on the Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct backbone, our model is instruction fine-tuned to generalize across previously unseen safety taxonomies and demonstrates strong performance on out-of-domain safety benchmarks. The instruction fine-tuning process uses a mix of synthetic and open-source safety datasets, augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales and input inversion to enhance contextual understanding and decision making. To support systematic evaluation, we also release RobloxGuard-Eval, a new benchmark featuring an extensible safety taxonomy to assess the effectiveness of LLM guardrails and moderation frameworks.

Ensuring safety is of paramount importance in physical human-robot interaction applications. This requires both adherence to safety constraints defined on the system state, as well as guaranteeing compliant behavior of the robot. If the underlying dynamical system is known exactly, the former can be addressed with the help of control barrier functions. The incorporation of elastic actuators in the robot's mechanical design can address the latter requirement. However, this elasticity can increase the complexity of the resulting system, leading to unmodeled dynamics, such that control barrier functions cannot directly ensure safety. In this paper, we mitigate this issue by learning the unknown dynamics using Gaussian process regression. By employing the model in a feedback linearizing control law, the safety conditions resulting from control barrier functions can be robustified to take into account model errors, while remaining feasible. In order to enforce them on-line, we formulate the derived safety conditions in the form of a second-order cone program. We demonstrate our proposed approach with simulations on a two-degree-of-freedom planar robot with elastic joints.

We introduce LlavaGuard, a family of VLM-based safeguard models, offering a versatile framework for evaluating the safety compliance of visual content. Specifically, we designed LlavaGuard for dataset annotation and generative model safeguarding. To this end, we collected and annotated a high-quality visual dataset incorporating a broad safety taxonomy, which we use to tune VLMs on context-aware safety risks. As a key innovation, LlavaGuard's new responses contain comprehensive information, including a safety rating, the violated safety categories, and an in-depth rationale. Further, our introduced customizable taxonomy categories enable the context-specific alignment of LlavaGuard to various scenarios. Our experiments highlight the capabilities of LlavaGuard in complex and real-world applications. We provide checkpoints ranging from 7B to 34B parameters demonstrating state-of-the-art performance, with even the smallest models outperforming baselines like GPT-4. We make our dataset and model weights publicly available and invite further research to address the diverse needs of communities and contexts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Developing accurate models for chemical reactors is often challenging due to the complexity of reaction kinetics and process dynamics. Traditional approaches require retraining models for each new system, limiting generalizability and efficiency. In this work, we take a step toward foundation models for chemical reactor modeling by introducing a neural network framework that generalizes across diverse reactor types and rapidly adapts to new chemical processes. Our approach leverages meta-learning to pretrain the model on a broad set of reactor dynamics, enabling efficient adaptation to unseen reactions with minimal data. To further enhance generalizability, we incorporate physics-informed fine-tuning, ensuring physically consistent adaptation to new reactor conditions. Our framework is evaluated across three integer-order fundamental reactor types - continuous stirred tank reactors, batch reactors, and plug flow reactors - demonstrating superior few-shot adaptation compared to conventional data-driven, physics-informed, and transfer learning approaches. By combining meta-learning with physics-informed adaptation, this work lays the foundation for a generalizable modeling framework, advancing the development of foundation models for chemical engineering applications. Source code is available at https://github.com/killingbear999/chemical-reactor-foundation-model.

Safety alignment is crucial to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave in ways that align with human preferences and prevent harmful actions during inference. However, recent studies show that the alignment can be easily compromised through finetuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. We aim to measure the risks in finetuning LLMs through navigating the LLM safety landscape. We discover a new phenomenon observed universally in the model parameter space of popular open-source LLMs, termed as "safety basin": random perturbations to model weights maintain the safety level of the original aligned model within its local neighborhood. However, outside this local region, safety is fully compromised, exhibiting a sharp, step-like drop. This safety basin contrasts sharply with the LLM capability landscape, where model performance peaks at the origin and gradually declines as random perturbation increases. Our discovery inspires us to propose the new VISAGE safety metric that measures the safety in LLM finetuning by probing its safety landscape. Visualizing the safety landscape of the aligned model enables us to understand how finetuning compromises safety by dragging the model away from the safety basin. The LLM safety landscape also highlights the system prompt's critical role in protecting a model, and that such protection transfers to its perturbed variants within the safety basin. These observations from our safety landscape research provide new insights for future work on LLM safety community. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ShengYun-Peng/llm-landscape.

Large language models (LLMs), as a novel information technology, are seeing increasing adoption in the Architecture, Engineering, and Construction (AEC) field. They have shown their potential to streamline processes throughout the building lifecycle. However, the robustness and reliability of LLMs in such a specialized and safety-critical domain remain to be evaluated. To address this challenge, this paper establishes AECBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to quantify the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in the AEC domain. The benchmark defines 23 representative tasks within a five-level cognition-oriented evaluation framework encompassing Knowledge Memorization, Understanding, Reasoning, Calculation, and Application. These tasks were derived from authentic AEC practice, with scope ranging from codes retrieval to specialized documents generation. Subsequently, a 4,800-question dataset encompassing diverse formats, including open-ended questions, was crafted primarily by engineers and validated through a two-round expert review. Furthermore, an LLM-as-a-Judge approach was introduced to provide a scalable and consistent methodology for evaluating complex, long-form responses leveraging expert-derived rubrics. Through the evaluation of nine LLMs, a clear performance decline across five cognitive levels was revealed. Despite demonstrating proficiency in foundational tasks at the Knowledge Memorization and Understanding levels, the models showed significant performance deficits, particularly in interpreting knowledge from tables in building codes, executing complex reasoning and calculation, and generating domain-specific documents. Consequently, this study lays the groundwork for future research and development aimed at the robust and reliable integration of LLMs into safety-critical engineering practices.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve answer quality through explicit chain-of-thought, yet this very capability introduces new safety risks: harmful content can be subtly injected, surface gradually, or be justified by misleading rationales within the reasoning trace. Existing safety evaluations, however, primarily focus on output-level judgments and rarely capture these dynamic risks along the reasoning process. In this paper, we present SafeRBench, the first benchmark that assesses LRM safety end-to-end -- from inputs and intermediate reasoning to final outputs. (1) Input Characterization: We pioneer the incorporation of risk categories and levels into input design, explicitly accounting for affected groups and severity, and thereby establish a balanced prompt suite reflecting diverse harm gradients. (2) Fine-Grained Output Analysis: We introduce a micro-thought chunking mechanism to segment long reasoning traces into semantically coherent units, enabling fine-grained evaluation across ten safety dimensions. (3) Human Safety Alignment: We validate LLM-based evaluations against human annotations specifically designed to capture safety judgments. Evaluations on 19 LRMs demonstrate that SafeRBench enables detailed, multidimensional safety assessment, offering insights into risks and protective mechanisms from multiple perspectives.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

This paper explores the rapidly evolving ecosystem of publicly available AI models, and their potential implications on the security and safety landscape. As AI models become increasingly prevalent, understanding their potential risks and vulnerabilities is crucial. We review the current security and safety scenarios while highlighting challenges such as tracking issues, remediation, and the apparent absence of AI model lifecycle and ownership processes. Comprehensive strategies to enhance security and safety for both model developers and end-users are proposed. This paper aims to provide some of the foundational pieces for more standardized security, safety, and transparency in the development and operation of AI models and the larger open ecosystems and communities forming around them.

The rapid advancement and widespread deployment of foundation model (FM) based systems have revolutionized numerous applications across various domains. However, the fast-growing capabilities and autonomy have also raised significant concerns about responsible AI and AI safety. Recently, there have been increasing attention toward implementing guardrails to ensure the runtime behavior of FM-based systems is safe and responsible. Given the early stage of FMs and their applications (such as agents), the design of guardrails have not yet been systematically studied. It remains underexplored which software qualities should be considered when designing guardrails and how these qualities can be ensured from a software architecture perspective. Therefore, in this paper, we present a taxonomy for guardrails to classify and compare the characteristics and design options of guardrails. Our taxonomy is organized into three main categories: the motivation behind adopting runtime guardrails, the quality attributes to consider, and the design options available. This taxonomy provides structured and concrete guidance for making architectural design decisions when designing guardrails and highlights trade-offs arising from the design decisions.

Large language models (LLMs), despite possessing latent safety understanding from their vast pretraining data, remain vulnerable to generating harmful content and exhibit issues such as over-refusal and utility degradation after safety alignment. Current safety alignment methods often result in superficial refusal shortcuts or rely on intensive supervision for reasoning-based approaches, failing to fully leverage the model's intrinsic safety self-awareness. We propose AlphaAlign, a simple yet effective pure reinforcement learning (RL) framework with verifiable safety reward designed to incentivize this latent safety awareness through proactive safety reasoning.} AlphaAlign employs a dual-reward system: a verifiable safety reward encourages correctly formatted and explicitly justified refusals for harmful queries while penalizing over-refusals, and a normalized helpfulness reward guides high-quality responses to benign inputs. This allows the model to develop proactive safety reasoning capabilities without depending on supervised safety-specific reasoning data. AlphaAlign demonstrates three key advantages: (1) Simplicity and efficiency, requiring only binary prompt safety labels and minimal RL steps for substantial improvements. (2) Breaking the safety-utility trade-off, by enhancing refusal of harmful content and reducing over-refusals, while simultaneously maintaining or even improving general task performance and robustness to unseen jailbreaks. (3) Deep alignment, fostering proactive safety reasoning that generates explicit safety rationales rather than relying on shallow refusal patterns.

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is critical as they are deployed in real-world applications. Existing guardrails rely on rule-based filtering or single-pass classification, limiting their ability to handle nuanced safety violations. To address this, we propose ThinkGuard, a critique-augmented guardrail model that distills knowledge from high-capacity LLMs by generating structured critiques alongside safety labels. Fine-tuned on critique-augmented data, the captured deliberative thinking ability drastically enhances the guardrail's cautiousness and interpretability. Evaluated on multiple safety benchmarks, ThinkGuard achieves the highest average F1 and AUPRC, outperforming all baselines. Compared to LLaMA Guard 3, ThinkGuard improves accuracy by 16.1% and macro F1 by 27.0%. Moreover, it surpasses label-only fine-tuned models, confirming that structured critiques enhance both classification precision and nuanced safety reasoning while maintaining computational efficiency.

Industrial processes must be robust and adaptable, as environments and tasks are often unpredictable, while operational errors remain costly and difficult to detect. AI-based control systems offer a path forward, yet typically depend on supervised learning with extensive labelled datasets, which limits their ability to generalize across variable and data-scarce industrial settings. Foundation models could enable broader reasoning and knowledge integration, but rarely deliver the quantitative precision demanded by engineering applications. Here, we introduceControl and Interpretation of Production via Hybrid Expertise and Reasoning (CIPHER): a vision-language-action (VLA) model framework aiming to replicate human-like reasoning for industrial control, instantiated in a commercial-grade 3D printer. It integrates a process expert, a regression model enabling quantitative characterization of system states required for engineering tasks. CIPHER also incorporates retrieval-augmented generation to access external expert knowledge and support physics-informed, chain-of-thought reasoning. This hybrid architecture exhibits strong generalization to out-of-distribution tasks. It interprets visual or textual inputs from process monitoring, explains its decisions, and autonomously generates precise machine instructions, without requiring explicit annotations. CIPHER thus lays the foundations for autonomous systems that act with precision, reason with context, and communicate decisions transparently, supporting safe and trusted deployment in industrial settings.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

Rapid advances in multimodal models demand benchmarks that rigorously evaluate understanding and reasoning in safety-critical, dynamic real-world settings. We present AccidentBench, a large-scale benchmark that combines vehicle accident scenarios with Beyond domains, safety-critical settings in air and water that emphasize spatial and temporal reasoning (e.g., navigation, orientation, multi-vehicle motion). The benchmark contains approximately 2000 videos and over 19000 human-annotated question--answer pairs spanning multiple video lengths (short/medium/long) and difficulty levels (easy/medium/hard). Tasks systematically probe core capabilities: temporal, spatial, and intent understanding and reasoning. By unifying accident-centric traffic scenes with broader safety-critical scenarios in air and water, AccidentBench offers a comprehensive, physically grounded testbed for evaluating models under real-world variability. Evaluations of state-of-the-art models (e.g., Gemini-2.5 Pro and GPT-5) show that even the strongest models achieve only about 18% accuracy on the hardest tasks and longest videos, revealing substantial gaps in real-world temporal, spatial, and intent reasoning. AccidentBench is designed to expose these critical gaps and drive the development of multimodal models that are safer, more robust, and better aligned with real-world safety-critical challenges. The code and dataset are available at: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/AccidentBench

Safety alignment mechanisms in large language models prevent responses to harmful queries through learned refusal behavior, yet these same mechanisms impede legitimate research applications including cognitive modeling, adversarial testing, and security analysis. While abliteration techniques enable surgical removal of refusal representations through directional orthogonalization, the relative effectiveness of available implementations remains uncharacterized. This study evaluates four abliteration tools (Heretic, DECCP, ErisForge, FailSpy) across sixteen instruction-tuned models (7B-14B parameters), reporting tool compatibility on all 16 models and quantitative metrics on subsets dictated by tool support. Single-pass methods demonstrated superior capability preservation on the benchmarked subset (avg GSM8K change across three models: ErisForge -0.28 pp; DECCP -0.13 pp), while Bayesian-optimized abliteration produced variable distribution shift (KL divergence: 0.043-1.646) with model-dependent capability impact. These findings provide researchers with evidence-based selection criteria for abliteration tool deployment across diverse model architectures. The principal finding indicates that mathematical reasoning capabilities exhibit the highest sensitivity to abliteration interventions, with GSM8K change ranging from +1.51 pp to -18.81 pp (-26.5% relative) depending on tool selection and model architecture.

Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled impressive generalization across diverse video understanding tasks under zero-shot settings. However, their capabilities in high-stakes industrial domains-where recognizing both routine operations and safety-critical anomalies is essential-remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce iSafetyBench, a new video-language benchmark specifically designed to evaluate model performance in industrial environments across both normal and hazardous scenarios. iSafetyBench comprises 1,100 video clips sourced from real-world industrial settings, annotated with open-vocabulary, multi-label action tags spanning 98 routine and 67 hazardous action categories. Each clip is paired with multiple-choice questions for both single-label and multi-label evaluation, enabling fine-grained assessment of VLMs in both standard and safety-critical contexts. We evaluate eight state-of-the-art video-language models under zero-shot conditions. Despite their strong performance on existing video benchmarks, these models struggle with iSafetyBench-particularly in recognizing hazardous activities and in multi-label scenarios. Our results reveal significant performance gaps, underscoring the need for more robust, safety-aware multimodal models for industrial applications. iSafetyBench provides a first-of-its-kind testbed to drive progress in this direction. The dataset is available at: https://github.com/raiyaan-abdullah/iSafety-Bench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are reshaping almost all industries, including software engineering. In recent years, a number of LLM agents have been proposed to solve real-world software problems. Such software agents are typically equipped with a suite of coding tools and can autonomously decide the next actions to form complete trajectories to solve end-to-end software tasks. While promising, they typically require dedicated design and may still be suboptimal, since it can be extremely challenging and costly to exhaust the entire agent scaffold design space. Recognizing that software agents are inherently software themselves that can be further refined/modified, researchers have proposed a number of self-improving software agents recently, including the Darwin-Gödel Machine (DGM). Meanwhile, such self-improving agents require costly offline training on specific benchmarks and may not generalize well across different LLMs or benchmarks. In this paper, we propose Live-SWE-agent, the first live software agent that can autonomously and continuously evolve itself on-the-fly during runtime when solving real-world software problems. More specifically, Live-SWE-agent starts with the most basic agent scaffold with only access to bash tools (e.g., mini-SWE-agent), and autonomously evolves its own scaffold implementation while solving real-world software problems. Our evaluation on the widely studied SWE-bench Verified benchmark shows that Live-SWE-agent can achieve an impressive solve rate of 75.4% without test-time scaling, outperforming all existing open-source software agents and approaching the performance of the best proprietary solution. Moreover, Live-SWE-agent outperforms state-of-the-art manually crafted software agents on the recent SWE-Bench Pro benchmark, achieving the best-known solve rate of 45.8%.

In dynamic operational environments, particularly in collaborative robotics, the inevitability of failures necessitates robust and adaptable recovery strategies. Traditional automated recovery strategies, while effective for predefined scenarios, often lack the flexibility required for on-the-fly task management and adaptation to expected failures. Addressing this gap, we propose a novel approach that models recovery behaviors as adaptable robotic skills, leveraging the Behavior Trees and Motion Generators~(BTMG) framework for policy representation. This approach distinguishes itself by employing reinforcement learning~(RL) to dynamically refine recovery behavior parameters, enabling a tailored response to a wide array of failure scenarios with minimal human intervention. We assess our methodology through a series of progressively challenging scenarios within a peg-in-a-hole task, demonstrating the approach's effectiveness in enhancing operational efficiency and task success rates in collaborative robotics settings. We validate our approach using a dual-arm KUKA robot.

Forecasting future trajectories of agents in complex traffic scenes requires reliable and efficient predictions for all agents in the scene. However, existing methods for trajectory prediction are either inefficient or sacrifice accuracy. To address this challenge, we propose ADAPT, a novel approach for jointly predicting the trajectories of all agents in the scene with dynamic weight learning. Our approach outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both single-agent and multi-agent settings on the Argoverse and Interaction datasets, with a fraction of their computational overhead. We attribute the improvement in our performance: first, to the adaptive head augmenting the model capacity without increasing the model size; second, to our design choices in the endpoint-conditioned prediction, reinforced by gradient stopping. Our analyses show that ADAPT can focus on each agent with adaptive prediction, allowing for accurate predictions efficiently. https://KUIS-AI.github.io/adapt

There is an increasing imperative to anticipate and understand the performance and safety of generative AI systems in real-world deployment contexts. However, the current evaluation ecosystem is insufficient: Commonly used static benchmarks face validity challenges, and ad hoc case-by-case audits rarely scale. In this piece, we advocate for maturing an evaluation science for generative AI systems. While generative AI creates unique challenges for system safety engineering and measurement science, the field can draw valuable insights from the development of safety evaluation practices in other fields, including transportation, aerospace, and pharmaceutical engineering. In particular, we present three key lessons: Evaluation metrics must be applicable to real-world performance, metrics must be iteratively refined, and evaluation institutions and norms must be established. Applying these insights, we outline a concrete path toward a more rigorous approach for evaluating generative AI systems.

Robots must operate safely when deployed in novel and human-centered environments, like homes. Current safe control approaches typically assume that the safety constraints are known a priori, and thus, the robot can pre-compute a corresponding safety controller. While this may make sense for some safety constraints (e.g., avoiding collision with walls by analyzing a floor plan), other constraints are more complex (e.g., spills), inherently personal, context-dependent, and can only be identified at deployment time when the robot is interacting in a specific environment and with a specific person (e.g., fragile objects, expensive rugs). Here, language provides a flexible mechanism to communicate these evolving safety constraints to the robot. In this work, we use vision language models (VLMs) to interpret language feedback and the robot's image observations to continuously update the robot's representation of safety constraints. With these inferred constraints, we update a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability safety controller online via efficient warm-starting techniques. Through simulation and hardware experiments, we demonstrate the robot's ability to infer and respect language-based safety constraints with the proposed approach.

Recent advancements in Web AI agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in addressing complex web navigation tasks. However, emerging research shows that these agents exhibit greater vulnerability compared to standalone Large Language Models (LLMs), despite both being built upon the same safety-aligned models. This discrepancy is particularly concerning given the greater flexibility of Web AI Agent compared to standalone LLMs, which may expose them to a wider range of adversarial user inputs. To build a scaffold that addresses these concerns, this study investigates the underlying factors that contribute to the increased vulnerability of Web AI agents. Notably, this disparity stems from the multifaceted differences between Web AI agents and standalone LLMs, as well as the complex signals - nuances that simple evaluation metrics, such as success rate, often fail to capture. To tackle these challenges, we propose a component-level analysis and a more granular, systematic evaluation framework. Through this fine-grained investigation, we identify three critical factors that amplify the vulnerability of Web AI agents; (1) embedding user goals into the system prompt, (2) multi-step action generation, and (3) observational capabilities. Our findings highlights the pressing need to enhance security and robustness in AI agent design and provide actionable insights for targeted defense strategies.

Not a day goes by without hearing about the impressive feats of large language models (LLMs), and equally, not a day passes without hearing about their challenges. LLMs are notoriously vulnerable to biases in their dataset, leading to issues such as toxicity. While domain-adaptive training has been employed to mitigate these issues, these techniques often address all model parameters indiscriminately during the repair process, resulting in poor repair quality and reduced model versatility. In this paper, we introduce a novel dynamic slicing-based intent-aware LLM repair strategy, IRepair. This approach selectively targets the most error-prone sections of the model for repair. Specifically, we propose dynamically slicing the model's most sensitive layers that require immediate attention, concentrating repair efforts on those areas. This method enables more effective repairs with potentially less impact on the model's overall performance by altering a smaller portion of the model. We evaluated our technique on three models from the GPT2 and GPT-Neo families, with parameters ranging from 800M to 1.6B, in a toxicity mitigation setup. Our results show that IRepair repairs errors 43.6% more effectively while causing 46% less disruption to general performance compared to the closest baseline, direct preference optimization. Our empirical analysis also reveals that errors are more concentrated in a smaller section of the model, with the top 20% of layers exhibiting 773% more error density than the remaining 80\%. This highlights the need for selective repair. Additionally, we demonstrate that a dynamic selection approach is essential for addressing errors dispersed throughout the model, ensuring a robust and efficient repair.

Despite careful safety alignment, current large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to various attacks. To further unveil the safety risks of LLMs, we introduce a Safety Concept Activation Vector (SCAV) framework, which effectively guides the attacks by accurately interpreting LLMs' safety mechanisms. We then develop an SCAV-guided attack method that can generate both attack prompts and embedding-level attacks with automatically selected perturbation hyperparameters. Both automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our attack method significantly improves the attack success rate and response quality while requiring less training data. Additionally, we find that our generated attack prompts may be transferable to GPT-4, and the embedding-level attacks may also be transferred to other white-box LLMs whose parameters are known. Our experiments further uncover the safety risks present in current LLMs. For example, in our evaluation of seven open-source LLMs, we observe an average attack success rate of 99.14%, based on the classic keyword-matching criterion. Finally, we provide insights into the safety mechanism of LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/SproutNan/AI-Safety_SCAV.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

Large language model (LLM)-based agentic frameworks increasingly adopt the paradigm of dynamically generating task-specific agents. We suggest that not only agents but also specialized software modules for scientific and engineering tasks can be generated on demand. We demonstrate this concept in the field of solid mechanics. There, so-called constitutive models are required to describe the relationship between mechanical stress and body deformation. Constitutive models are essential for both the scientific understanding and industrial application of materials. However, even recent data-driven methods of constitutive modeling, such as constitutive artificial neural networks (CANNs), still require substantial expert knowledge and human labor. We present a framework in which an LLM generates a CANN on demand, tailored to a given material class and dataset provided by the user. The framework covers LLM-based architecture selection, integration of physical constraints, and complete code generation. Evaluation on three benchmark problems demonstrates that LLM-generated CANNs achieve accuracy comparable to or greater than manually engineered counterparts, while also exhibiting reliable generalization to unseen loading scenarios and extrapolation to large deformations. These findings indicate that LLM-based generation of physics-constrained neural networks can substantially reduce the expertise required for constitutive modeling and represent a step toward practical end-to-end automation.

The change in data distribution over time, also known as concept drift, poses a significant challenge to the reliability of online learning methods. Existing methods typically require model retraining or drift detection, both of which demand high computational costs and are often unsuitable for real-time applications. To address these limitations, a lightweight, fast and efficient random vector functional-link network termed Lite-RVFL is proposed, capable of adapting to concept drift without drift detection and retraining. Lite-RVFL introduces a novel objective function that assigns weights exponentially increasing to new samples, thereby emphasizing recent data and enabling timely adaptation. Theoretical analysis confirms the feasibility of this objective function for drift adaptation, and an efficient incremental update rule is derived. Experimental results on a real-world safety assessment task validate the efficiency, effectiveness in adapting to drift, and potential to capture temporal patterns of Lite-RVFL. The source code is available at https://github.com/songqiaohu/Lite-RVFL.

The rapid rise of open-weight and open-source foundation models is intensifying the obligation and reshaping the opportunity to make AI systems safe. This paper reports outcomes from the Columbia Convening on AI Openness and Safety (San Francisco, 19 Nov 2024) and its six-week preparatory programme involving more than forty-five researchers, engineers, and policy leaders from academia, industry, civil society, and government. Using a participatory, solutions-oriented process, the working groups produced (i) a research agenda at the intersection of safety and open source AI; (ii) a mapping of existing and needed technical interventions and open source tools to safely and responsibly deploy open foundation models across the AI development workflow; and (iii) a mapping of the content safety filter ecosystem with a proposed roadmap for future research and development. We find that openness -- understood as transparent weights, interoperable tooling, and public governance -- can enhance safety by enabling independent scrutiny, decentralized mitigation, and culturally plural oversight. However, significant gaps persist: scarce multimodal and multilingual benchmarks, limited defenses against prompt-injection and compositional attacks in agentic systems, and insufficient participatory mechanisms for communities most affected by AI harms. The paper concludes with a roadmap of five priority research directions, emphasizing participatory inputs, future-proof content filters, ecosystem-wide safety infrastructure, rigorous agentic safeguards, and expanded harm taxonomies. These recommendations informed the February 2025 French AI Action Summit and lay groundwork for an open, plural, and accountable AI safety discipline.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines such as biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research remains an underexplored area, with existing benchmarks primarily focus on textual content and overlooking key scientific representations such as molecular, protein, and genomic languages. Moreover, the safety mechanisms of LLMs in scientific tasks are insufficiently studied. To address these limitations, we introduce SciSafeEval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs across a range of scientific tasks. SciSafeEval spans multiple scientific languages - including textual, molecular, protein, and genomic - and covers a wide range of scientific domains. We evaluate LLMs in zero-shot, few-shot and chain-of-thought settings, and introduce a 'jailbreak' enhancement feature that challenges LLMs equipped with safety guardrails, rigorously testing their defenses against malicious intention. Our benchmark surpasses existing safety datasets in both scale and scope, providing a robust platform for assessing the safety and performance of LLMs in scientific contexts. This work aims to facilitate the responsible development and deployment of LLMs, promoting alignment with safety and ethical standards in scientific research.

Several approaches are proposed to deal with the problem of the Automatic Schema Matching (ASM). The challenges and difficulties caused by the complexity and uncertainty characterizing both the process and the outcome of Schema Matching motivated us to investigate how bio-inspired emerging paradigm can help with understanding, managing, and ultimately overcoming those challenges. In this paper, we explain how we approached Automatic Schema Matching as a systemic and Complex Adaptive System (CAS) and how we modeled it using the approach of Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation (ABMS). This effort gives birth to a tool (prototype) for schema matching called Reflex-SMAS. A set of experiments demonstrates the viability of our approach on two main aspects: (i) effectiveness (increasing the quality of the found matchings) and (ii) efficiency (reducing the effort required for this efficiency). Our approach represents a significant paradigm-shift, in the field of Automatic Schema Matching.

As Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) become increasingly autonomous and complex, understanding their error modes is critical for ensuring their reliability and safety. However, research in this area has been severely hampered by the lack of large-scale, diverse datasets with precise, ground-truth error labels. To address this bottleneck, we introduce AEGIS, a novel framework for Automated Error Generation and Identification for Multi-Agent Systems. By systematically injecting controllable and traceable errors into initially successful trajectories, we create a rich dataset of realistic failures. This is achieved using a context-aware, LLM-based adaptive manipulator that performs sophisticated attacks like prompt injection and response corruption to induce specific, predefined error modes. We demonstrate the value of our dataset by exploring three distinct learning paradigms for the error identification task: Supervised Fine-Tuning, Reinforcement Learning, and Contrastive Learning. Our comprehensive experiments show that models trained on AEGIS data achieve substantial improvements across all three learning paradigms. Notably, several of our fine-tuned models demonstrate performance competitive with or superior to proprietary systems an order of magnitude larger, validating our automated data generation framework as a crucial resource for developing more robust and interpretable multi-agent systems. Our project website is available at https://kfq20.github.io/AEGIS-Website.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

Current methods for content safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), often rely on multi-stage training pipelines and lack fine-grained, post-deployment controllability. To address these limitations, we propose a unified co-training framework that efficiently integrates multiple safety behaviors: positive (lawful/prosocial), negative (unfiltered/risk-prone) and rejective (refusal-oriented/conservative) within a single SFT stage. Notably, each behavior is dynamically activated via a simple system-level instruction, or magic token, enabling stealthy and efficient behavioral switching at inference time. This flexibility supports diverse deployment scenarios, such as positive for safe user interaction, negative for internal red-teaming, and rejective for context-aware refusals triggered by upstream moderation signals. This co-training strategy induces a distinct Safety Alignment Margin in the output space, characterized by well-separated response distributions corresponding to each safety mode. The existence of this margin provides empirical evidence for the model's safety robustness and enables unprecedented fine-grained control. Experiments show that our method matches the safety alignment quality of SFT+DPO, with our 8B model notably surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) in safety performance, while significantly reducing both training complexity and deployment costs. This work presents a scalable, efficient, and highly controllable solution for LLM content safety.

In recent years there has been a tremendous surge in the general capabilities of AI systems, mainly fuelled by training foundation models on internetscale data. Nevertheless, the creation of openended, ever self-improving AI remains elusive. In this position paper, we argue that the ingredients are now in place to achieve openendedness in AI systems with respect to a human observer. Furthermore, we claim that such open-endedness is an essential property of any artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI). We begin by providing a concrete formal definition of open-endedness through the lens of novelty and learnability. We then illustrate a path towards ASI via open-ended systems built on top of foundation models, capable of making novel, humanrelevant discoveries. We conclude by examining the safety implications of generally-capable openended AI. We expect that open-ended foundation models will prove to be an increasingly fertile and safety-critical area of research in the near future.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become more widespread, the content safety risks associated with their use also increase. We find a notable deficiency in high-quality content safety datasets and benchmarks that comprehensively cover a wide range of critical safety areas. To address this, we define a broad content safety risk taxonomy, comprising 13 critical risk and 9 sparse risk categories. Additionally, we curate AEGISSAFETYDATASET, a new dataset of approximately 26, 000 human-LLM interaction instances, complete with human annotations adhering to the taxonomy. We plan to release this dataset to the community to further research and to help benchmark LLM models for safety. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the dataset, we instruction-tune multiple LLM-based safety models. We show that our models (named AEGISSAFETYEXPERTS), not only surpass or perform competitively with the state-of-the-art LLM-based safety models and general purpose LLMs, but also exhibit robustness across multiple jail-break attack categories. We also show how using AEGISSAFETYDATASET during the LLM alignment phase does not negatively impact the performance of the aligned models on MT Bench scores. Furthermore, we propose AEGIS, a novel application of a no-regret online adaptation framework with strong theoretical guarantees, to perform content moderation with an ensemble of LLM content safety experts in deployment

As the performance of large language models (LLMs) continues to advance, their adoption is expanding across a wide range of domains, including the medical field. The integration of LLMs into medical applications raises critical safety concerns, particularly due to their use by users with diverse roles, e.g. patients and clinicians, and the potential for model's outputs to directly affect human health. Despite the domain-specific capabilities of medical LLMs, prior safety evaluations have largely focused only on general safety benchmarks. In this paper, we introduce a safety evaluation protocol tailored to the medical domain in both patient user and clinician user perspectives, alongside general safety assessments and quantitatively analyze the safety of medical LLMs. We bridge a gap in the literature by building the PatientSafetyBench containing 466 samples over 5 critical categories to measure safety from the perspective of the patient. We apply our red-teaming protocols on the MediPhi model collection as a case study. To our knowledge, this is the first work to define safety evaluation criteria for medical LLMs through targeted red-teaming taking three different points of view - patient, clinician, and general user - establishing a foundation for safer deployment in medical domains.