The Americas: The Shining Path Fights On in Peru ---- By Gustavo Gorriti
As Alberto Fujimori prepares to take over as Peru's next president on July 28, the question of whether the Shining Path will hound his administration as it has the previous two ranks high among his concerns. Among Shining Path watchers ("Senderlogos") there is strong disagreement on fundamentals: Is the Shining Path getting stronger or weaker? Is it making progress or losing ground among the population? And finally, who is actually winning the war? There are no easy answers. There is not much of a dispute on the basic data, however. The Shining Path went to war in 1980, on the same day Peru was holding general elections after 12 years of a military dictatorship. Its first actions were cautious, modest and often ludicrous in a crazy way (like hanging dogs from lampposts, with scribbled insults over them to Chinese Communist martyrs). But the actions intensified and soon became quite lethal. While President Fernando Belaunde's regime did what it could to maintain democratic legality at first, it was quite unprepared to deal with any insurgency -- especially with one that had been meticulously planned and organized several years before the first shot was fired. In October 1981, emergency laws were imposed for the first time on part of Peru; they covered only 2% of the population. Now about 50% of all Peruvians live under emergency law. In 10 years, the war between the Shining Path and the government has cost about 20,000 lives. Damages are estimated at $16 billion, or about 85% of Peru's annual gross national product. If the armed forces have been rightly accused of systematic violations of human rights (Peru ranks as one of the world's worst human-rights offenders), the military faults the civilian authorities for failing to provide much-needed leadership. Mr. Belaunde (the first to deal with the problem), who tried to ignore the insurgency out of existence, is regarded as a well-meaning but inept leader. There are no kind words for Mr. Garcia, on the other hand. In the first weeks of his mandate, he made several right moves -- like emphasizing his role as commander in chief of the armed forces and reorganizing the corruption-ridden police. But things began to unravel soon after. At first, he tried a liberal approach, looking for a dialogue with the fanatical Shining Path, and sending scores of young professionals to the emergency areas to attack what he said were the "root causes" of the insurgency. But dialogue was disdainfully rejected: Dozens of these professionals were assassinated, and the armed forces slowed down their actions, while the rebels made largely unimpeded progress. Then, Mr. Garcia tried a tougher approach, and human-rights violations surged to their current level. And for the first time, death squads -- linked by some analysts to Mr. Garcia's APRA Party -- began to contribute to the killing. Midpoint during his term, Mr. Garcia lost all hope of defeating the Shining Path, and decided just to coexist with it, says Rafael Merino, a respected analyst on security matters. Not even in that was Mr. Garcia successful, as violence climbed steadily during the second half of his term. In 1988, 1,986 people were killed as a result of insurgent or counterinsurgent actions; in 1989, 3,198 were killed; and 1,730 during the first six months of 1990. How well is Mr. Fujimori expected to deal with the insurgency? His campaign pitch advocated an approach closely resembling that of Mr. Garcia's first year. According to Francisco Loayza, Mr. Fujimori's adviser on internal-security matters, military actions against the Shining Path should be subordinated to economic-development initiatives. "{The military} should mainly provide security for development projects," Mr. Loayza says. He stressed that the main thrust of Mr. Fujimori's "pacification" policies would be to address the "structural violence {read: social injustice} that makes subversion possible." Mr. Loayza says that President Garcia's approach failed because of corruption and ineptitude. He also feels that the Shining Path is weakened, and that an important Shining Path faction would be willing to engage in peace talks. This is only wishful thinking, according to Mr. Merino: "If President Fujimori thinks he'll finish the war through those `pacification' policies, it will be like riding into battle with no better dress or weapons than a tuxedo." Actually, Mr. Fujimori might end up implementing internal war policies that would be quite different from those advocated during his campaign. At least, that's what seems is going to happen with the economy, where the vote-getting populist message appears in the process of being replaced by a far more orthodox approach. Free-market economist Hernando de Soto, who has been advising Mr. Fujimori during the past month, thinks that might be the case. "He learns fast," Mr. de Soto told me recently, "and he has all the right instincts." Even if Mr. Fujimori proves to be a quick learner, he will have his work cut out for him. Running against all major trends of contemporary history, the insurgents have followed Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman with the commitment that the faithful reserve for their prophet. This was evident when walking through their safe house in Lima. It looked, said a Peruvian journalist, like the seed for the future "Museum of the Revolution" -- wood carvings; woven baskets; tapestries; paintings; chiseled stone; all meticulously, lovingly crafted with the mythified motifs of the internal war. There were also the hagiographic representations of Mr. Guzman himself, in the various postures that endeavored to combine the heroic with the intellectual. A whole closed, inbred culture, developed in the underground and unnoticed by most Peruvians -- except when it explodes in their faces. --- Mr. Gorriti is a Peruvian author and journalist.
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